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Taxing Political Donations: The Case for
Corrective Taxes in Campaign Finance
David S. Gamage
Campaign finance lives in a time warp, untouched by the regulatory
revolution of the past generation.
-Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres'
INTRODUCTION
Incentive-based regulations are generally more efficient than command-
and-control measures.2 One of the primary categories of incentive-based
regulations-and one that has gained significant support of economics
scholars over the past few decades-is corrective taxation. Corrective
1. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 1 (2002).
2. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 15 (2002)
("[E]conomists have long questioned the efficiency of centrally-determined, uniform standards.");
see also Dennis D. Hirsch, Symposium Introduction: Second Generation Policy and the New
Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2001); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental
Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 682 (1999) (claiming that
there is a consensus among analysts that "incentive-based instruments such as taxes and tradeable
allowances should generally be chosen over technology requirements and fixed emissions
standards").
3. For a brief summary of the debate between the merits of corrective taxes and quantity
regulations, see ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 626-29 (5th
ed. 2000). For a more sophisticated account of these arguments, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL &
WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed. 1988); and Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2002).
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taxes, under various guises, are used in numerous areas of the law:4 "Sin
taxes" are the method of choice for regulating goods such as cigarettes and
alcohol, 5 pollution taxes are familiar tools of environmental law,6 and
liability rules play a central role in tort law.7 Nevertheless, the potential of
corrective taxes has been overlooked in the debates over campaign finance
refonm. 8
The equivalent of command-and-control measures in campaign finance
law are contribution ceilings, which lie at the heart of the American
approach to regulating campaign finance.9 Current law places a $2000
ceiling on donations from individuals to political candidates.10 This limit is
supplemented by a $5000 ceiling on donations from individuals to political
4. The economics literature often uses the term "Pigouvian" taxes in the place of "corrective
taxes." See, e.g., BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 1-3.
5. See, e.g., David J. DePippo, Comment, I'll Take My Sin Taxes Unwrapped and Maximized,
with a Side oflnelasticity, Please, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 543, 551-54 (2002).
6. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675,
679 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV.
713 (1996). Liability rules are essentially the private law equivalent of corrective taxes. Although
the revenue from corrective taxes generally goes to the government while the revenue from
liability rules generally goes to the victims, some proposals for corrective taxes distribute revenue
to parties harmed by the externalities they regulate, and some forms of liability rules permit the
government to collect the tortfeasors' payments.
8. While this Note is the first proposal for using corrective taxes in campaign finance, a few
scholars have suggested taxing campaign donations for other reasons. Most analogously, several
scholars have mentioned the possibility of taxing wealthy donors and subsidizing poor ones.
Guido Calabresi has discussed these ideas in class lectures at the Yale Law School, but he has
never published his thoughts nor has he formally presented them. The first published reference to
a proposal of this sort comes as an aside in Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter:
A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1204, 1233-35 (1994). More
recently, Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres briefly reject a Calabresi-like proposal as an alternative
to their plan for campaign finance reform. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 40-44. The
Supreme Court is not likely to permit taxation of campaign donations based strictly on donor
wealth. See infra note 104.
More generally, a number of scholars have debated taxing campaign expenditures under the
framework of the corporate or gift tax sections of the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Daniel L.
Simmons, An Essay on Federal Income Taxation and Campaign Finance Reform, 54 FLA. L. REV.
1 (2002); Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code,
37 GA. L. REV. 611, 648-53 (2002). Yet, unlike corrective taxes, these proposals are either
designed to raise revenue or else to target specific forms of independent expenditures.
9. Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 34 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1179, 1211-12 (2002). A few scholars have
recently begun criticizing the preoccupation with command-and-control measures in campaign
finance. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 3-5; Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality
and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1994). However, these scholars'
suggestions for "incentive-based" alternatives are mostly limited to voucher proposals and other
forms of public financing. Curiously, even their footnotes fail to consider corrective taxes.
10. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 § 307(a)(1), 2 U.S.C.A.§ 441a(a)(1)(A) (West 2003). Before the recent BCRA legislation, this ceiling was set at $1000.
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2000) (amended 2002).
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action committees," a $25,000 ceiling on donations from individuals to
national party committees,' 2 and an assortment of additional ceilings on
numerous other forms of political donations. 13 Contribution ceilings have
become an enduring component of our system of campaign finance
regulation.
14
There are critics of this reliance on contribution ceilings.1 5 Some argue
that caps on campaign contributions violate First Amendment rights,16 help
incumbents against challengers, 17  and lead donors to divert their
contributions through regulatory loopholes.' 8 The (mostly conservative)
adherents of this position favor allowing donors to contribute unlimited
sums to political campaigns. Meanwhile, others argue that permitting even
moderately sized donations is incompatible with true political equality.'
9
The (mostly liberal) adherents of this position would replace private
donations with government-financed campaigns or a regulated system of
public debates.
This Note is not directed at either of these positions.2° Instead, I begin
with the premise that political donations are neither categorically harmful
nor categorically benign. I accept the underlying purpose of contribution
ceilings: to limit the size of political donations without completely banning
11. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
12. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(B).
13. Most crucially, the aggregate amount of hard money an individual can donate is capped at
$95,000 per election cycle. See id. § 44 1 a(a)(3).
14. Contribution ceilings were first introduced at the federal level in 1940. Anthony Corrado,
Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN
FINANCE SOURCEBOOK (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 13),
http://www.brookings.org/gs/cf/newsourcebk.htm. Many state campaign finance systems also rely
on contribution ceilings, although the levels of these caps vary widely. See The Gubernatorial
Campaign Finance Database, at http://www.unc.edu/-beyle/laws.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
15. See, e.g., POLITICAL MONEY: DEREGULATING AMERICAN POLITICS (Annelise Anderson
ed., 2000) (collecting a variety of short pieces arguing for and against campaign finance
regulation on a number of grounds).
16. See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S.
604, 640 (1996); Williamson M. Evers, Liberty of the Press Under Socialism, in POLITICAL
MONEY: DEREGULATING AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 15, at 94.
17. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996).
18. This argument is often labeled the "hydraulic" critique. For a particularly eloquent
articulation of this position, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech,
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (1997). See also Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The
Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999).
19. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 8; Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996);
Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of
Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 (1994).
20. Critics of contribution ceilings might still find my ideas to be of some value. Opponents
of capping donations might support contribution taxes as a second-best alternative to their ideal of
no regulation, and contribution taxes might interest opponents of private financing as a means for
supplementing, or funding, a regime of public financing. But these arguments are not the focus of
my Note.
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them. In order to achieve such an end, this Note applies the logic of
corrective taxes to the problem of campaign finance. Specifically, I argue
for replacing contribution ceilings with "contribution taxes., 21 Rather than
capping the size of political donations at a specified dollar level, I propose
taxing donations based on a schedule of graduated rates-the larger the size
22of a contribution, the higher the rate of taxation. The argument proceeds
on a highly theoretical level; questions about design variables are largely
outside the scope of this Note.23 Instead, I present an economic argument
for why contribution taxes are superior to contribution ceilings.
My argument stems from a single observation: As compared to
contribution ceilings, contribution taxes affirmatively select for donors with
a greater willingness to pay taxes on their donations. To demonstrate this
point, imagine that donors were required to obtain government permits
before contributing any given amount to a candidate. Under this
hypothetical, a contribution ceiling would grant every donor a permit to
contribute up to the amount of the ceiling. In contrast, contribution taxes
would distribute permits based on a donor's willingness to pay the tax.
Donors with greater willingness to pay taxes would receive permits
allowing them to donate larger amounts, while donors who were unwilling
to pay the taxes would be allowed to donate only small amounts.24 Instead
21. I use the term "contribution tax" loosely to refer to any form of corrective tax that might
be levied on campaign donations.
22. The assumption that taxes can be set at graduated rates is important for my conclusions.
Economists writing about environmental regulation often assume that it is administratively
impossible to set taxes at graduated rates. When tax rates must be flat, direct quantity restraints(such as contribution ceilings) may be superior to pricing mechanisms (such as contribution
taxes), depending on the relative slopes of the marginal harm and marginal cost abatement
functions. See Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REv. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974).
This economic argument for using quantity regulations instead of corrective taxes no longer
applies, however, when taxes can be set at graduated rates. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3.
In the campaign finance setting, this seems eminently feasible: As long as an administrative
agency can keep records on the various donations made by each individual, it should be possible
to implement a system of contribution taxes with graduated rates. For instance, we could require
donors to send contribution checks to a candidate's account at the Federal Election Commission(FEC) rather than directly to candidates. The FEC could then deduct the appropriate amount of
tax-based on a database of the individual's previous contributions-before sending the funds on
to the candidate.
23. There are numerous ways to implement a policy of contribution taxes. For instance,
although it would probably be administratively easier to levy the taxes on candidates, the taxes
could also be levied on donors. Yet questions about design variables are not unique to the
discussion of contribution taxes. There are also numerous possibilities for implementing a system
of contribution ceilings. Compare Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The
Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 301, 351-60 (1989) (proposing $100
contribution ceilings and aggregate limits on contributions from PACs), with Norman Ornstein,
Eight Modest Ideas for Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform, in A USER'S GUIDE TOCAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 149, 153-56 (Gerald C. Lubenow ed., 2001) (proposing $3000
contribution ceilings and additional disclosure provisions).
24. This claim assumes a zero-percent tax rate for small donations. Otherwise, a donor
unwilling to pay any taxes would not be able to contribute at all. In any case, donors would need
to purchase the "permits" from the government for the amount of the tax.
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of capping all donors at the same level, contribution taxes allow donors to
contribute up to the maximum amount at which they are still willing to pay
the associated tax.
There are two advantages to allowing donors with greater willingness
to pay taxes to contribute larger amounts. First, in a sense, these donors
derive greater value from contributing. According to microeconomic
theory, the value someone receives from purchasing a good or service can
be measured by the amount the person would be willing to pay for the good
25
or service. The difference between the amount a consumer would be
willing to pay for a good and the cost of producing the good equals the
economic surplus created by the transaction.26 In the case of campaign
donations, a donor's economic surplus equals the maximum level of
contribution taxes the donor would be willing to pay for the privilege of
making a donation. As compared to contribution ceilings, contribution taxes
create more total surplus by affirmatively selecting for donors with greater
willingness to pay taxes--donors who derive greater surplus from
contributing.27
The second advantage comes from the possibility of donors diverting
their contributions through "regulatory loopholes" when prevented from
contributing directly.28 The regulatory system has proven unable to block
all of the ways in which donors can spend money on behalf of a candidate.
When prevented from contributing directly, some donors divert their funds
into independent expenditures or other methods of indirectly aiding their
favored candidates. Diversions of this sort are an endemic problem of
campaign finance regulation. Still, not all donors will divert their funds
when prevented from contributing directly. Ideally, a system of campaign
finance regulation would only block donations to the extent they can be
limited without causing donors to divert their funds.29 Contribution taxes
come much closer to this goal than contribution ceilings. Contribution
ceilings prevent all donors from contributing more than a fixed amount,
regardless of the likelihood that donors will divert their funds in response.
In contrast, contribution taxes only block donors who are unwilling to pay
25. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 123-27.
26. The presence of externalities complicates the calculation of economic surplus. See infra
Subsection I.A.1.
27. The increased surplus generated by contribution taxes over contribution ceilings may
come in the form of tax revenue, private surplus retained by the donors, or a combination of the
two factors. See infra Subsection I.A. 1.
28. The term "regulatory loopholes" is not meant to be pejorative. Generally speaking, one
person's loophole is another person's free speech. For our purposes, it suffices to say that
constitutional and practical constraints prevent lawmakers from completely stopping donors from
diverting their funds. See infra Subsection I.B. 1.
29. More accurately, an ideal system of campaign finance regulation would strive to
minimize both the harm caused when donors divert their funds and the harm caused when donors
contribute more than is socially optimal. See infra Section I.B.
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the tax. All else being equal, we can expect a strong correlation between
donors who are willing to pay large taxes and donors who are likely to
divert their funds. Hence, when the two policies are set based on the same
goals, contribution taxes should cause less diversion than contribution
ceilings.
My argument proceeds on two levels. Part I models the advantages of
contribution taxes in greater detail. As compared to contribution ceilings,
contribution taxes generate more total surplus and less overall diversion.
The Introduction has already explained the basic intuitions behind these two
advantages. Part I demonstrates that these intuitions are robust in the face of
more rigorous economic analysis.
Part II relaxes some of my assumptions to argue that contribution taxes
remain superior to contribution ceilings in the real world. Hence, Part II
discusses questions that my model assumes away: Would contribution taxes
exacerbate the problems of corruption or inequality? Are contribution taxes
constitutional? Can we actually quantify the harms caused by donations'?
This Part does not attempt to fully resolve these questions nor to respond to
all possible objections, but merely aims to show that contribution taxes do
not generate any disadvantages serious enough to overpower the two
advantages demonstrated by Part I.
I. A COMPARATIVE MODEL OF CONTRIBUTION CEILINGS
AND CONTRIBUTION TAXES
I begin with the premise that private donations are neither categorically
harmful nor categorically benign. Both contribution ceilings and
contribution taxes are mechanisms for limiting the size of private donations
without completely banning them. Either policy mechanism can place more
or less severe restrictions on private donations. Just as a $20,000
contribution ceiling is less restrictive than a $200 contribution ceiling, a 9%
marginal tax rate is less restrictive than a 90% marginal tax rate. Whereas
contribution ceilings reduce the size of large donations by capping the
donations at a specified dollar level, contribution taxes reduce the size of
large donations by the amount of the tax. Some donors may increase the
amount they contribute in order to offset the effects of the tax, but taxes
will still tend to reduce the after-tax size of political donations. A
sufficiently high tax rate can reduce the average size of political donations
by the same amount as any contribution ceiling.
The question, then, is whether contribution ceilings or contribution
taxes are a better method of limiting the size of private donations. If the two
policies are set to reduce the average size of political donations to the same
level, which policy option preserves the most benefit while reducing the
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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most harm? To answer this question, this Part builds a model based on three
simplifying assumptions:
1. Neither the externalities generated by a contribution, nor the
transaction costs associated with diverting a contribution, are
directly correlated with donor willingness to pay contribution
taxes (Assumption of No Correlation).
2. Contribution taxes are a constitutionally acceptable
method of regulating campaign donations (Assumption of
Constitutionality).
3. Policymakers can and will set the tax rates at their socially
optimal levels (Assumption of Perfect Implementation).
When combined with the basic maxims of microeconomic theory, these
assumptions allow me to model the choice between contribution ceilings
and contribution taxes using a simplified form of cost-benefit analysis. The
model assumes that the harms and benefits of campaign donations can be
quantified-that there is a direct relationship between the amount a donor
contributes and the level of harm and benefit generated by her donation.
We can express this relationship through a set of functions; for any
amount a donor could contribute, we can determine a single value for total
benefit and a single value for total harm. 30 As a result, we can calculate a
socially optimal contribution size for every individual donor3 1-the point at
which total benefit exceeds total harm by the maximum possible amount.32
We can judge a regulatory policy by how close it brings donors to
contributing at socially optimal levels.33
30. For example, where x represents donation size, one donor's contributions might generate
a level of total harm equal to x2 and a level of total benefit ecual to 1 000x, while a second donor's
contributions might generate a level of total harm equal to x and a level of total benefit equal to
150x 2 . Although it need not be the case that different donors' contributions create different
benefits and costs relative to their magnitude, see infra Subsection I.A.2, the model that this Note
employs accounts for such a possibility.
31. Continuing from the previous footnote, we can calculate the donors' socially optimal
contribution sizes based on the marginal harm and benefit created by each additional dollar of
their contributions. Taking the derivative of total harm and benefit with respect to donation size
(in order to determine the donation size at which the two values are equal for each donor), the
marginal harm is 2x for the first donor and 3x2 for the second, while the marginal benefit is 1000
for the first donor and 300x for the second. Consequently, the socially optimal amount for each
donor to contribute is $500 for the first donor and $100 for the second.
32. It is possible for donors to have more than one socially optimal contribution size. But we
can ignore this possibility in constructing the model. By definition, we should be indifferent
among the multiple socially optimal contribution points at which a donor might contribute and we
can treat these donors as having only one socially optimal point.
33. Some donors might have socially optimal contribution points at zero or at infinity. Yet the
initial premise that donations should be limited, but not banned, dictates that most donors cannot
have socially optimal contribution points at these levels.
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Unfortunately, we cannot simply command donors to contribute
socially optimal amounts. Nor can we custom-tailor our regulations to
individual donors. As an underlying premise, this Note assumes that we
cannot differentially tax donors based on the harms caused by their
donations-harms such as corruption and inequality.34 Contribution taxes
would become even more efficient if we could adjust the tax rates based on
donors' wealth or on the degree to which donors seek to corrupt the
political process. Yet contribution ceilings could also be made more
efficient by adjusting the caps based on these factors. My model assumes
that the Constitution, practical reality, and political considerations require
that both contribution ceilings and contribution taxes use a donation's size
as the primary proxy for its tendency to cause harm. But as long as
regulations cannot be completely tailored to individual characteristics,
changing this assumption would not undermine the conclusions of the
model.
Hence, under a policy of contribution ceilings, all donors face the same
ceilings; under a policy of contribution taxes, all donors face the same tax
rates. Still, contribution taxes are more custom-tailored than contribution
ceilings. Where contribution ceilings cap all donations at the same level,
contribution taxes selectively regulate donors based on their willingness to
pay the taxes. Consequently, as compared to contribution ceilings,
contribution taxes generate more total surplus and less overall diversion.
Section A models this result assuming donors cannot divert their funds, and
Section B expands the model to incorporate diverted funds.35
A. Modeling the Two Policy Options Assuming Donors Cannot
Divert Their Funds
Economic transactions create surplus because consumers prefer
purchased goods to any alternative uses for their money and producers
prefer receiving the money to keeping their goods. The same rule holds for
campaign donations. Although it is not entirely clear what donors are
purchasing when they make campaign contributions, the donors must prefer
the results of contributing to any alternative uses for their money or else
they would not contribute. When regulations prevent donors from
contributing as much as they would like, the regulations deprive donors of
34. For further discussion of these harms, see infra Subsections II.A.1-2.
35. It is worth noting that this argument differs from the standard economic case for
corrective taxes. The standard case is based on information asymmetries-the taxed parties are
assumed to have better knowledge about the costs and benefits of their behavior than the
government. I briefly discuss the implications of information asymmetries in Section II.C, after
relaxing the Assumption of Perfect Implementation.
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some of the value they would have received from contributing at their
desired level. As such, the regulations reduce donor surplus.
Of course, regulations may also prevent social harm. When regulations
eliminate more social harm than donor surplus, the regulations create a net
benefit for society. But the donor surplus is still lost. If an alternative
regulation could prevent the same amount of social harm without
eliminating the donor surplus, this regulation would produce an even
greater net benefit for society.
A critic might object that this definition for surplus implies that wealthy
donors derive greater surplus from contributing on account of their greater
ability to afford the costs of making a donation. Yet this result is inherent to
the concept of economic efficiency.36 Any negative social consequences
from inequality are factored into the total harm caused by the donation.
Again, if an alternative regulation could prevent the same amount of
inequality and other harms without eliminating donor surplus, this
regulation would produce a greater net benefit for society.37
This result holds even if we think donors do not deserve their surplus
for some moral reason. The government has numerous tools-such as taxes
and fees-for expropriating a donor's private surplus or for transferring that
surplus to other private parties. These tools are often inefficient in the sense
that a portion of the private surplus may be lost in the course of the
expropriation or transfer. Still, the government should be able to absorb at
least some percentage of the private surplus enjoyed by "undeserving"
donors. When regulations destroy private surplus, they harm society even if
the original possessors of that surplus were thought to be undeserving.
Regardless of how we feel about the reasons donors derive private surplus
from contributing, an alternative regulation capable of mitigating harms
without destroying surplus would still produce a greater net benefit for
society.
The remainder of this Section argues that contribution taxes can do just
that. When contribution taxes are set so as to prevent the same amount of
harm as a policy of contribution ceilings, they can preserve more total
surplus. To demonstrate this point, this Section models how donors respond
to the alternative policies of contribution ceilings and contribution taxes,
ignoring for now the possibility that donors will divert their funds when
prevented from contributing directly.
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1. Defining the Elements of Surplus
Donors decide how much to contribute based on the private benefit they
receive from contributing. A donor will only contribute a given amount if
she receives more private benefit from donating than it costs for her to
make the donation. Donor private benefit encompasses all of the reasons
donors make political contributions.38 For instance, if a donor thinks that
making a large contribution will corrupt the political process, then the
donor's private benefit will be reduced by the degree to which the donor
values not creating this type of corruption. Still, donors will frequently
undervalue the social consequences of their contributions when deciding
how much to donate. 39 The degree to which the social consequences of a
contribution diverge from the donor's private benefit is labeled as
externalities.40  Positive externalities refer to any desirable social
consequences of contributing that donors do not factor into their private
benefit, and negative externalities refer to any harmful social consequences
of contributing that donors do not factor into their private benefit. Since our
goal is to reduce the size of donations, we can assume that negative
externalities tend to exceed positive ones.4 1 Hence, for simplicity, I use the
term "externalities" to refer to net negative externalities-total negative
externalities minus total positive externalities.
Without regulation, a donor will base the size of her contribution on the
relationship between her private benefit and the cost of the donation. The
difference between these two factors is her private surplus. As long as the
marginal surplus she receives from adding an additional dollar to her
contribution is positive, she will increase the size of her donation; in doing
so, she will contribute up to the point where her marginal surplus becomes
38. As such, private benefit is an inherently subjective concept. I assume that donors are at
least somewhat rational and that the government does not understand a donor's private benefit any
better than the donors do themselves. A more in-depth examination of the nature of private benefit
is well beyond the scope of this Note.
39. If donors fully internalized the social consequences of their donations, there would be no
need to regulate campaign donations. Hence, we assume that donations produce negative
externalities based on the initial premise that donations ought to be limited.
40. Unlike traditional microeconomic analysis, this model factors any benefit that candidates
receive from a donation into the calculation of externalities. The model will therefore not include
any term equivalent to "producer" (i.e., candidate) surplus. The reason for this is that candidates
should value a contribution at a level exactly equal to its dollar amount. We could make a more
complicated model that would include a measure of candidate surplus-perhaps as the difference
between the dollar amount of a contribution and the candidate's cost of soliciting the contribution,
or as the additional degree of prestige or legitimacy that each contribution confers upon a given
candidate. But introducing complexity of this sort would only obscure the basic point of the
model.
41. If positive externalities exceeded negative ones, an optimal regulatory policy would strive
to increase the amount donors contributed rather than to reduce the size of private donations. For
small donations, where positive externalities may exceed negative ones, a policy of contribution
taxes should include a zero-percent tax bracket--or even a potential contribution tax credit.
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zero. The social consequences of a contribution can be measured by the
difference between donor surplus and externalities. At the point where
donors contribute without regulation, marginal donor surplus is zero and
marginal negative externalities will tend to exceed positive ones.
Consequently, in the absence of regulation, donors will contribute above the
level at which their contributions would generate the maximum amount of
total surplus-the donors' surplus-maximizing amounts. Figure 1 illustrates
this result.







x, = Surplus-Maximizing Contribution Point
X2 = Contribution Point Without Regulation
This merely restates the premise that unregulated donors will contribute
above their socially optimal levels. When donors cannot divert their funds
to other means of political financing, a donor's socially optimal
contribution size equals the donor's surplus-maximizing contribution size.
Under a regime of contribution ceilings, total surplus consists of two
elements: donor surplus and externalities. Thus, under a system of
contribution ceilings, a donor's surplus-maximizing contribution size is the
point where marginal donor surplus equals marginal externalities. Moving
to a regime of contribution taxes introduces a third element to total
surplus-tax revenue. Under a system of contribution taxes, a donor's
surplus-maximizing contribution size is the point at which marginal donor
surplus plus marginal tax revenue equals marginal externalities. Still, the
mere fact that contribution taxes generate revenue is not a reason for
adopting them. The government has numerous means for generating
revenue. Additional revenue is not the advantage of contribution taxes;
rather, tax revenue is merely a byproduct of the additional flexibility that a
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system of tax constraints-as opposed to a uniform limit on political
contributions-creates. This flexibility is the true advantage of contribution
taxes, and is what accounts for the increased surplus generated by replacing
contribution ceilings with contribution taxes.
In general, taxes create disincentives to engage in the taxed behavior.
As a result, taxes deter transactions that would have created surplus for both
parties to the transaction in the absence of a tax. Economists label this lost
surplus "deadweight" loss. 4 2 As with all corrective taxes, contribution taxes
are designed for the express purpose of creating disincentives to engage in
the taxed behavior-the giving of large campaign donations. Yet corrective
taxes regulate activities that produce negative externalities-activities
where private parties, left to their own devices, generate deadweight loss by
engaging in too much of the regulated activity. Consequently, corrective
taxes generate social surplus rather than deadweight lOSS. 4 3
As Robert Cooter explains, regulations like contribution taxes "raise
revenues for the government by correcting distortions in the allocation of
resources rather than by creating such distortions. The revenues raised by
nondistorting taxes can be substituted for the revenues raised by distorting
taxes like the income tax, thus increasing efficiency." 4 The revenue raised
by contribution taxes is essentially free money, as it is raised not by
creating economic inefficiency, but rather as a means of avoiding such
inefficiency. In a sense, the need to pay taxes forces donors to transfer to
the government some of the private benefit they receive from contributing,
and as a result, to bear the costs ("internalize") some of the negative
externalities that their donations create. Tax revenue is subtracted from the
donors' private surplus, and instead becomes surplus that belongs to the
government. As such, the revenue generated by contribution taxes remains
an important component of total surplus, but one that is not in the hands of
the donor. Whereas total surplus equals donor surplus minus externalities
under a system of contribution ceilings, under a system of contribution
taxes, total surplus equals tax revenue (government surplus) plus donor
surplus minus externalities.
2. Holding Both Externalities and Surplus Constant Across Donors
If all donors were the same with respect to both externalities and
private benefit, the contribution taxes and contribution ceilings would be
equally efficient. Both policy options strive to reduce donations to their
42. See, e.g., PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 292.
43. Of course, this only holds true when the contribution taxes are designed to implement
regulatory goals. A contribution tax set to maximize tax revenue might cause deadweight loss by
over- or underdeterring donations.
44. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1536 n.29 (1984).
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surplus-maximizing levels. The surplus-maximizing amount for a donor to
contribute is determined by the interaction of externalities and the donor's
private benefit. Consequently, in a world where all donors are the same
with respect to both externalities and private benefit, every donor would
have the same surplus-maximizing contribution point.
One method of inducing donors to contribute surplus-maximizing
amounts would be to set a contribution ceiling equal to their surplus-
maximizing contribution size. By definition, a ceiling set at this level would
prohibit donors from contributing above their surplus-maximizing amounts.
Also by definition, a donor's private benefit must exceed the cost of
contributing at the donor's surplus-maximizing level, and thus donors
would not contribute less than this amount. As a result, a properly set
contribution ceiling would lead all donors to contribute at surplus-
maximizing levels.
FIGURE 2. EXTERNALITIES AND PRIVATE SURPLUS
HELD CONSTANT ACROSS DONORS
Contribution Externalities
Marginal Ceiling I Taxes
Cost /  Donor
Benefit S
Xl x2  Contribution
Size
x, = Contribution Point with Ceiling = Surplus-Maximizing Point
X2= Contribution Point Without Ceiling
An appropriately set schedule of contribution taxes would also lead all
donors to contribute surplus-maximizing amounts. Contribution taxes
would raise the cost of making a donation and thereby reduce donors'
private surplus by the amount of the tax. In order to lead donors to
contribute surplus-maximizing amounts, contribution taxes must be set
equal to the level of externalities accompanying contributions. As such, the
marginal tax rate on each additional dollar of a contribution must equal the
marginal level of externalities. With tax rates set in this fashion, donors
would internalize the level of externalities into their decisions of how much
to contribute. By reducing donors' private surplus to zero at the surplus-
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maximizing contribution size, contribution taxes would lead all donors to
contribute surplus-maximizing amounts.
As a result, contribution ceilings and contribution taxes would be
equally efficient in a world where all donors were the same with respect to
both externalities and private benefit. Figure 2 above illustrates this result.
Contribution taxes would transfer a portion of the donor surplus to the
government in the form of tax revenue. But both regulatory systems would
lead donors to contribute at the same surplus-maximizing levels. The two
regulatory systems would produce equivalent amounts of total surplus.
3. Holding Externalities Constant Across Donors While Allowing
Private Surplus To Vary
Once we allow private surplus to vary among donors, we begin to see
how contribution taxes generate more surplus than contribution ceilings.
Consider a hypothetical world where all donors are the same with respect to
externalities but differ with respect to private benefit. Since private surplus
would vary among individual donors while externalities remained constant,
the surplus-maximizing contribution sizes would also vary among
individual donors. Contribution taxes would still lead all donors to
contribute at their surplus-maximizing levels, but contribution ceilings
would overregulate some donors and underregulate others.
Since it is not possible to set separate contribution ceilings for each
individual donor, contribution ceilings must be set based on the harms and
benefits caused by the average contribution. In other words, policymakers
must set the ceiling at the point that maximizes overall social surplus. This
point will not be surplus-maximizing with respect to any individual donor
whose private surplus differs from the average. Consequently, setting a
contribution ceiling at this point creates errors of overregulation and of
underregulation. The ceiling would reduce some donations to below their
surplus-maximizing sizes, while also failing to limit other donations sized
above their surplus-maximizing amounts.
In contrast, contribution taxes would lead all donors to contribute at
their surplus-maximizing levels. Setting the taxes equal to externalities
would cause donors to internalize the social consequences of their
contributions. Donors would only contribute a given amount if their private
surplus exceeded the externalities. Hence, taxes would not generate errors
of underregulation. In addition, donors would never contribute less than
their surplus-maximizing amount, as the marginal private surplus they
would receive from increasing the size of their contribution would exceed
the marginal tax rate. Taxes would therefore not generate errors of
overregulation. Whereas contribution ceilings must be set based on
externalities and private benefit, taxes can be set based only on the level of
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externalities. As such, contribution taxes remain efficient even when the
level of private surplus varies across individual donors. Figure 3 illustrates
this result.
FIGURE 3. EXTERNALITIES CONSTANT ACROSS DONORS,
PRIVATE SURPLUS VARIES
M arginal Y. f .
Cost/







x1 x2  x3 Contribution
Size
x, = Contribution Point for Donor 1 with Tax = Surplus-Maximizing
Contribution Point
X2 = Contribution Point for Donor 1 and Donor 2 with Ceiling
X3 = Contribution Point for Donor 2 with Tax = Surplus-Maximizing
Contribution Point
x2-X1 - Amount by Which Ceiling Underregulates Donor 1
X3 - X2 = Amount by Which Ceiling Overregulates Donor 2
4. Allowing Both Externalities and Private Surplus
To Vary Across Donors
Now consider the situation in the real world, where donors differ with
respect to both externalities and private benefit. Under these circumstances,
contribution taxes can no longer be perfectly efficient. As donors will
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generate different levels of externalities, the tax rates can no longer be set
equal to externalities for all donors. As a result, contribution taxes will
generate errors of underregulation and of overregulation. Nevertheless, the
use of contribution taxes will still generate fewer regulatory errors than
contribution ceilings, and thus produce more total surplus.
When externalities differ, the contribution tax rates must be set equal to
expected externalities, or the level of externalities generated by the average
contribution. 45 The taxes will overregulate contributions that produce a
smaller level of externalities than average and underregulate contributions
that produce a larger level of externalities than average. Nevertheless,
setting the tax rates at this level maximizes overall surplus. Although
donors will no longer internalize the actual externalities generated by their
contributions, they will still internalize the expected level of externalities.
As a group, the donors who still contribute after paying the tax will
generate more total private surplus from contributing than total
externalities. And, as a group, the donors deterred by the tax would have
generated less total private surplus from contributing than total
externalities.
In comparison, a policy of contribution ceilings must either ban all
donations of a given size or else leave all donations of the given size
unregulated. For instance, consider donations of size x. If we set the
contribution ceiling equal to x or higher, we will effectively leave all
donations of size x unregulated. Conversely, if we set the contribution
ceiling below x, we will effectively ban all donations of size x. As such,
contribution ceilings are a far blunter instrument for minimizing errors of
overregulation and underregulation.
Contribution taxes generate errors of overregulation when a donation's
externalities are below average and errors of underregulation when a
donation's externalities are above average. Still, for any given size of
donations, the combined errors of overregulation and underregulation
produce less total harm than would either banning all donations of a given
size or leaving all donations of that size unregulated.46 Since tax rates will
be set equal to expected externalities, donors will only contribute a given
amount when they receive more private surplus than the expected
externalities of their contribution. Hence, for any given size of donations,
the total surplus generated by permitting donors to contribute at the given
size must be positive. 47 We could generate even more surplus with
45. For a mathematical explanation for why optimal tax rates should be set equal to expected
externalities in the field of environmental regulation, see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3.
46. It is worth reemphasizing that this conclusion depends on the Assumption of No
Correlation.
47. This conclusion will not hold if the expected level of externalities is so high as to exceed
the private surplus received by all donors. See infra Subsection I.A.5.
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regulations that were custom-tailored to fit the level of externalities that
each individual's contributions would create. But if such a policy is
impossible or impracticable, contribution taxes produce more surplus than
would completely banning all donations of the given size (as would occur
under a contribution ceiling regime). Likewise, setting tax rates equal to
expected externalities only deters donors from contributing a given amount
when their private surplus is less than the expected level of externalities.
Consequently, the overall surplus generated by deterring this group of
donors must be positive.48 Again, custom-tailored regulations would
generate even more surplus, but contribution taxes still produce more
surplus than would leaving all donations of a given size unregulated (the
result under a contribution ceiling). Combining these two propositions,
even though contribution taxes are less efficient than custom-tailored
regulations, taxing donations of a given size produces more surplus than
either completely banning all donations of the size or leaving all donations
of the size unregulated-the two options available under a contribution
ceiling. As such, contribution taxes still generate more total surplus than
contribution ceilings when donors differ with respect to externalities.
5. Comparing the Policy Options with Respect to the Largest and
Smallest Donations
Under the assumptions of the model, contribution taxes produce more
total surplus than contribution ceilings. However, contribution taxes are not
necessarily more efficient across the entire range of donation sizes. We can
still imagine scenarios where the two policies would be equally efficient
with respect to a subset of the largest or the smallest donations.
Contribution ceilings only generate errors of overregulation when the
private surplus received by a donor exceeds the level of externalities. If the
externalities were always larger than a donor's private benefit, the ceilings
would not generate errors of overregulation. Similarly, contribution ceilings
only generate errors of underregulation when the private surplus received
by a donor is smaller than the level of externalities. If the externalities were
always less than a donor's private benefit, ceilings would not generate
errors of underregulation. Of course, contribution taxes could also avoid
generating regulatory errors under these scenarios. But, in either of the
scenarios, contribution taxes would no longer generate more surplus than
contribution ceilings.
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Our initial premise that private donations should be limited but not
completely banned tells us that neither of these scenarios is accurate with
respect to the entire range of donation sizes. If all donors faced a level of
expected externalities in excess of their private surplus, we would be better
off completely banning all donations. Likewise, if all donors enjoyed more
private surplus than the expected level of externalities, we would be better
off leaving all donations unregulated. Nevertheless, these scenarios might
hold true for a subset of the largest or smallest donations.
With respect to the smallest donations, the level of expected
externalities might well be less than the private surplus received by all
donors. Many commentators favor encouraging small donations rather than
limiting them.49 To this end, some scholars advocate using subsidies to
persuade more donors to contribute small amounts.5 0 Hence, we might
reasonably conclude that small donations do not generate net negative
externalities. Indeed, they might even generate net positive externalities. If
this is true, an ideal regulatory system would not limit small donations.
Contribution ceilings achieve this result as the ceilings only block donations
sized larger than the cap. Yet contribution taxes can also achieve this result
when the tax rates are set equal to net negative externalities. If the positive
externalities generated by small donations exceed the negative ones, we can
easily set a zero-percent tax bracket for the small donations.5'
Consequently, both policy options can leave small donations unregulated.
Similarly, both policy options ban the largest donations. Even without
regulation, donors cannot contribute infinite sums. At some point, the cost
of donating must exceed all donors' private surplus. By increasing the cost
of donating by the amount of the tax, contribution taxes lower the
maximum point at which any donor is willing to contribute. If the level of
expected externalities exceeds all donors' private surplus for a subset of
large donations, a tax rate set equal to expected externalities would prevent
all of these donors from contributing. With respect to the largest donations,
a tax rate set equal to expected externalities is equivalent to a contribution
ceiling.
Altogether, then, we may be indifferent between contribution taxes and
contribution ceilings as applied to the largest and smallest donations. Yet
49. DAVID ROSENBERG, BROADENING THE BASE: THE CASE FOR A NEW FEDERAL TAX
CREDIT FOR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 1 (2002) ("[M]any observers, from the left and right,
agree that the inclusion of small, local donors in political campaigns is vital to the overall health
of our democracy.").
50. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1; HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, TAX
INCENTIVES FOR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS? (1961) (proposing the use of tax credits);
ROSENBERG, supra note 49; Sunstein, supra note 9 (proposing the use of vouchers).
5 1. A subsidy, such as a tax credit or matching grant, might produce even more surplus under
these conditions. Evaluating the merits of a subsidy plan or a negative tax rate is beyond the scope
of this Note. A policy of subsidies might run into administrative problems that are not present in a
system of contribution taxes.
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contribution taxes still produce more total surplus when applied to the wide
array of donations sized between these two extremes.
For a contribution ceiling to be optimal, two conditions must be met.
First, private surplus must exceed expected externalities for all donations
smaller than the ceiling. And second, private surplus must be smaller than
expected externalities for all donations larger than the ceiling.
Considering that donors vary widely in the private surplus they receive
from contributing, there should be a large band of contribution sizes where
expected externalities exceed private surplus for some donors but not for
others. Most voters able to contribute to political campaigns choose not to
do so. 52 Based on any realistic distribution of private surplus, many donors
must value the results of contributing only marginally above the cost of
making a contribution.53 On the other extreme, some donors clearly receive
a great deal of surplus from contributing. For example, George Soros
recently pledged to spend over $10 million to defeat President Bush.54 He
seems willing to spend this money even though campaign finance laws
prevent him from donating directly to his chosen candidate, presumably
reducing the effectiveness of his donation. It is hard to know how much
surplus donors like Soros derive from contributing. Still, the fact that
George Soros is willing to contribute $10 million suggests that at least some
donors would still be willing to contribute large amounts even when faced
with a tax. Thus, we can reasonably conclude that many donors receive
great surplus from making political donations. Although Soros is an outlier,
he is an outlier who proves the overall point. If Soros represents the upper
bound of donor surplus, and the lower bound of donor surplus approaches
zero, there should be a wide range in the amount of surplus donors derive
from contributing. In any case, we can safely conclude that the level of
expected externalities does not jump dramatically at the level of the
contribution ceiling. If a typical contribution of $2000 produces only
minimal harm, a typical contribution of $2001 should produce only
minimal harm as well.
Consequently, there should be a wide band of donation sizes where
donor surplus sometimes, but not always, exceeds expected externalities.
Within this band, contribution taxes generate more surplus than
contribution ceilings. Both policies overregulate some donors and
52. In the 2002 congressional campaigns, only 0.22% of the U.S. voting-age population
contributed more than $200-the minimum threshold for disclosure regulations. ADAM LIOZ, U.S.
PIRG EDUC. FUND, THE ROLE OF MONEY IN THE 2002 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 4 (2003).
53. Donor surplus probably follows a normal distribution, more or less. Since the bulk of
potential donors do not contribute, average surplus is below zero and all donors who actually
contribute fall within the same tail of the distribution. Consequently, more donors will enjoy zero
surplus than any larger amount.
54. Ted Bunker, Reform Only Diverts Soft Campaign Cash, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 1, 2003,
at 21.
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underregulate others, but contribution taxes bring donors much closer to
contributing at their surplus-maximizing levels.
B. Expanding the Model To Incorporate Diverted Funds
Up to now, I have modeled the decision to donate as a binary choice.
Donors could choose either to contribute money to a candidate or to spend
their money on unrelated goods or services. Yet in the real world, donors
also have the option of diverting their money into independent expenditures
or other methods of indirectly aiding their chosen candidates.
The American system of campaign finance regulation does not limit all
of the ways money can be spent to aid a political campaign. 55 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly protected an individual's right to make independent
expenditures even when those expenditures are intended to "advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office. 56
Under the Court's current jurisprudence, Congress is constitutionally
prohibited from limiting the amount an individual can divert into
independent expenditures. 57 The Court has also protected the rights of
certain nonprofit organizations to gather individual donations and spend
them on behalf of a candidate.58 I argue in Section I.B that contribution
taxes are constitutional when levied on direct contributions, but the Court
would likely strike down contribution taxes placed on independent
expenditures or other forms of diverted funds.59 Hence, anyone willing to
make independent expenditures or contribute to an appropriate nonprofit
organization can spend unlimited sums to aid a political campaign.
Without exploring all of the ways a donor might divert her funds to aid
a favored candidate, I can still factor the possibility of diversion into the
model. For the purposes of the model, it suffices that donors always have
the option of diverting their funds into independent expenditures. To begin
exploring the effects of this option, it is instructive to compare the harms
55. While the precise scope of individuals' abilities to spend money on behalf of a candidate
is somewhat in doubt after the Court's decision last year in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003), at a minimum, some opportunities for diversion will remain
beyond the reach of permissible regulation.
56. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (per curiam); see also Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996) (extending the right to
make independent expenditures to political parties).
57. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
58. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). There is
some doubt as to the continued viability of this holding in the wake of McConnell.
59. Congress can only tax First Amendment speech as part of a broad-based tax scheme or to
promote a compelling state interest. See infra Section lI.B. Considering that the Court has already
ruled that Congress cannot place contribution ceilings on independent expenditures, it seems
unlikely that Congress would be able to use contribution taxes instead. See Mass. Citizens for Life,
479 U.S. at 265 ("[W]e must be as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech as we are
against.its sweeping restriction.").
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caused by diverted funds with the harms caused by direct contributions in a
world without transaction costs.
1. Examining the Implications of Diverted Funds in a World Without
Transaction Costs
Imagine for a moment that diverted funds could aid a political
campaign just as effectively as direct contributions. Further imagine that
donors would derive the same value from diverting their funds as they
would from contributing directly. In this hypothetical world, there would
not be any transaction costs involved in diverting funds. Political candidates
would be indifferent between receiving direct contributions and having
funds diverted on their behalf. As a result, diverted funds would create all
of the same harms as direct contributions.
Furthermore, diverted funds would also create at least three additional
harms: First, diverted funds reduce transparency. When donors contribute
directly to candidates, voters can track the sources of the candidate's funds.
In contrast, it can be very difficult to track diverted funds. Although
disclosure does not alleviate all of the harms caused by large contributions,
it can hold politicians accountable for particularly egregious fundraising
practices. For example, during the 1996 election, President Clinton suffered
in the polls after the Dole campaign attacked his fundraising scandals.6°
Disclosure can also inform voters about a candidate by associating the
candidate with well-known causes or interest groups.61 Additionally,
disclosure can make it harder for candidates to pander to special interests by
helping voters to recognize this activity as pandering.62 As the old saying
goes, sunshine is the best disinfectant. Most scholars of campaign finance
agree that disclosure has salutary effects.
63
Second, diverted funds increase the appearance of corruption---or, as
Kathleen Sullivan describes the problem, diverted funds increase the
"symbolic costs from subterfuge. 64 In her words, "Public perception of a
campaign finance system gone out of control rests at least in part on the
view that politicians, parties, and donors skirt existing laws by exploiting
evasive 'loopholes.' To the extent that all functional contributions are made
as explicit contributions," the public might regain confidence in our
60. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 689-90.
61. See ELIZABETH GARRETT & DANIEL A. SMITH, VEILED ACTORS: THE REAL THREAT TO
CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE STATUTES (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch., Pub. Policy Research Paper
No. 03-13, 2003), http://lawweb.usc.edu/cleo/working-papers/olin/documents/03_13_paper.pdf.
62. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 689.
63. See GARRETT & SMITH, supra note 61, at I (stating that "disclosure elicits fairly
widespread support").
64. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 689.
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65political system. Many scholars worry that voters are becoming
increasingly alienated from politics and from government. 66 Increasingly,
voters seem to feel that all politicians are corrupt.67 Rampant cynicism and
disengagement are the predictable results.68 Diverted funds are only one
cause of this problem, but they are a cause capable of being addressed.
Third, diverted funds lead to more polarizing attack ads and negative
politics. According to Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, "[G]roups
that engage in independent advocacy have strong incentives to stress one
issue around which to mobilize supporters and contributors as opposed to
the range of programmatic positions that candidates must take." 69 Single-
issue ads of this sort can polarize the political debate by focusing attention
on the issues that are least susceptible to compromise.7 ° Whereas candidates
are often reluctant to issue attack ads for fear of voter retaliation, most
groups funding independent expenditures will not be deterred by the fear of
voter retaliation. Consequently, reducing the prevalence of diverted funds
might go a long way toward improving the tenor of political campaigns.
In a world without transaction costs, diverted funds would cause all of
the same harms as direct contributions, in addition to reducing
transparency, increasing the appearance of corruption, and inducing more
attack ads and negative politics. Since donors would be indifferent between
making direct contributions and diverting their funds, both contribution
ceilings and contribution taxes would have wholly negative effects. Any
donor wishing to contribute above the amount of a ceiling would simply
divert her funds instead. And any donor confronted with a contribution tax
would divert her funds in order to avoid paying the tax. As these diverted
funds would create all of the same harms as direct contributions, plus
additional negative effects, society would be better off without any form of
campaign finance regulation.
2. Exploring the Implications of Transaction Costs
Fortunately, in the real world transaction costs decrease the
effectiveness of diverted funds. Transaction costs refer to all of the reasons
donors might prefer to make direct contributions instead of diverting their
funds. For example, if a donor feels that diverting her funds is unethical,
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Back to the Future of the American State: Overruling
Buckley v. Valeo and Other Madisonian Steps, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 443,443 (1996).
67. Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring
the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1127-31(1994).
68. Id.
69. Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 18, at 1714-15.
70. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 100 (1998).
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she will likely face high transaction costs as a result. Similarly, donors face
transaction costs to the extent that they need to spend time and resources
investigating methods of diverting their funds.
Arguably, the most important components of transaction costs come
from regulations intended to decrease the effectiveness of diverted funds.
For instance, campaign finance regulations prohibit coordinated
expenditures. Hence, independent expenditures cannot be "controlled by or
coordinated with [a] candidate. 71 Without coordination, independent
expenditures will usually be less effective than direct contributions.
Whereas candidates choose how to spend the money from direct
contributions, independent expenditures will typically not be spent in the
fashion that a candidate would find most useful. According to the Supreme
Court, "[I]ndependent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. '72 And as
Issacharoff and Karlan explain, "Independent expenditures risk alienating
both the supported candidate whose campaign control was compromised
and the unsupported candidate, who was visibly not supported ....
Independent expenditures are less effective than direct contributions,
but they usually provide some benefit to a candidate. Groups would not
engage in independent expenditures if they were not at least somewhat
helpful. Evidence from the states' experiences with contribution ceilings
suggests that independent expenditures rise in response to the regulation of
direct contributions.74 Independent expenditures may produce less "bang for
their buck," but if enough bucks are diverted into independent expenditures
they can still produce a sizeable bang. In the words of Daniel Lowenstein,
although "independent spending is not always helpful .... [o]rdinarily,
independent spending will be helpful, at least to some degree. 75
Consequently, transaction costs reduce the effectiveness of diverted
funds. Most donors derive greater value from direct contributions, but still
derive some value from diverting their funds. Transaction costs measure the
difference between the value a donor derives from contributing directly and
the value the donor would have received from diverting her funds. When
blocked from contributing directly, donors will divert their funds if and
only if the surplus they would have received from contributing directly
exceeds their transaction costs. Furthermore, under a contribution tax
71. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976) (per curiam). Sections 202 and 212 of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act contain a definition of coordination. See Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 §§ 202, 212, 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 434, 441a(a)(7) (West 2003). For the pre-BCRA
definition, see General Public Political Communications Coordinated with Candidates and Party
Committees, 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.16, 100.23, 109.1, 110.14 (2002).
72. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
73. Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 18, at 1714.
74. Id.
75. Lowenstein, supra note 23, at 360.
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system, donors will only engage in diversion if the transaction costs of
doing so are less than the taxes they will pay for direct contribution.
3. Holding Transaction Costs and Externalities Constant
Across Donors
To model whether a restriction on direct contributions would cause
donors to divert their funds, we can start by picturing a world where all
donors face the same transaction costs and the same externalities. In this
hypothetical world, the transaction costs would create a pseudo-tax on the
value a donor would receive from diverting her funds. By definition, the
benefit a donor receives from making a direct contribution exceeds the
benefit she would receive from diverting her funds by the amount of the
transaction costs. Hence, if direct contributions were left unregulated,
donors would never divert their funds.
Likewise, an ideal regulatory system must not cause any donors to
divert their funds. Under the old model in Section A, an ideal regulatory
system would have led all donors to contribute at their surplus-maximizing
levels. Without the possibility of diversion, surplus-maximizing
contribution sizes were also socially optimal. However, as the term is used
in this Note, total surplus does not include any of the benefits associated
with inducing donors to contribute directly rather than diverting their
funds.76 Diverted funds create all of the same externalities as direct
contributions in addition to further harms. Hence, a regulatory system that
leads all donors to contribute at their surplus-maximizing levels cannot be
socially optimal if it causes donors to divert their funds.
Under the old model, a donor's socially optimal contribution size was
the point at which marginal donor surplus equaled marginal externalities-
the surplus-maximizing level. Yet under the expanded model, a donor's
surplus-maximizing amount is not socially optimal if preventing the donor
from contributing more than that amount would cause her to divert her
funds. Consequently a donor's socially optimal contribution size cannot be
larger than her minimum nondiversion point-the smallest point where her
contribution can be capped without leading her to divert her funds. As such,
a donor's socially optimal contribution size is equal to either her surplus-
maximizing point or her minimum nondiversion point, whichever is larger.
Restating this relationship in terms of donor surplus, the socially optimal
76. Some readers may be uncomfortable with defining surplus in this fashion. Essentially,
this definition limits the concept of externalities to not include any of the harms that would have
been generated had a contribution been diverted instead of sent directly to a candidate. The
analytical result is the same if one instead defines surplus and externalities more broadly to
include the effects of diversion, but I use these more limited definitions because they provide a
more helpful organizational structure to the argument.
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contribution size becomes the larger of either the point where marginal
donor surplus equals marginal externalities (the surplus-maximizing point)
or the point where marginal donor surplus equals marginal transaction costs
(the minimum nondiversion point).
When all donors are the same with respect to both transaction costs and
externalities, contribution taxes can lead all donors to contribute at their
socially optimal levels. An optimal contribution tax schedule would either
set the tax rates equal to marginal externalities or to an amount just below
the marginal transaction costs, whichever is smaller. Since contribution
taxes reduce donors' contributions to the level where marginal donor
surplus equals the marginal tax rate, donors will contribute at the larger of
either their surplus-maximizing point or their minimum nondiversion point.
Hence, under the terms of the hypothetical, an optimal contribution tax
schedule would lead all donors to contribute socially optimal amounts.
In contrast, even an optimal contribution ceiling would cause some
donors to divert their funds. If we continued to set our contribution ceilings
equal to the surplus-maximizing contribution size of the average donor, all
donors whose private surplus exceeds transaction costs at the level of the
ceiling would divert their funds. Consequently, contribution ceilings cause
some donors to divert their funds while allowing other donors to contribute
above their surplus-maximizing amounts. 77 An optimal contribution ceiling
must be set to minimize the combined harm from these two types of
regulatory errors. Since diverted funds cause greater externalities than the
same amount of direct contributions, an optimal contribution ceiling would
need to be set above the surplus-maximizing contribution size of the
average donor-the level of the ceiling under the old model. By definition,
a ceiling set at the surplus-maximizing contribution size minimizes the
combined errors of overregulation and underregulation with respect to total
surplus. Hence, raising the ceiling above this level destroys more surplus by
introducing errors of underregulation than it creates by eliminating errors of
overregulation. As compared to contribution taxes, contribution ceilings
produce even less total surplus under the new model than under the old
model. Whereas contribution taxes lead all donors to contribute socially
optimal amounts, contribution ceilings cause some donors to divert their
funds while allowing others to contribute above their socially optimal
levels.
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4. Allowing Transaction Costs and Externalities To Vary
Across Donors
Within a world where all donors face the same externalities and the
same transaction costs, contribution taxes would lead all donors to
contribute socially optimal amounts. However, in the real world, donors
will typically differ with respect to both transaction costs and (as discussed
78previously) externalities. As we have already seen, if externalities vary,
optimal tax rates can no longer be set equal to actual externalities, but
instead must be set equal to expected externalities. Tax rates set at these
levels minimize the combined harm from errors of overregulation and of
underregulation.
Similarly, if transaction costs vary, optimal tax rates can no longer be
set just below the level of actual transaction costs. We could instead set the
tax rates just below the expected level of transaction costs, but this would
cause some donors to divert their funds. As such, optimal contribution tax
rates must be set to balance the additional harm caused by leading donors to
divert their funds against the harm caused by allowing donors to contribute
above their socially optimal levels. For simplicity, however, let us assume
that optimal tax rates are set at the minimum of expected externalities and
expected transaction costs. Whether these tax rates are actually optimal
depends on the total harm caused by donors diverting their funds as
compared to the total harm caused by donors contributing above their
socially optimal levels; as long as the magnitude of these two harms is
roughly proportional, tax rates set at the minimum of expected externalities
and expected transaction costs should be close to optimal.
Tax rates set at this level cannot completely prevent donors from
diverting their funds, nor can they lead all donors to contribute socially
optimal amounts. Still, for any given size of contributions, setting tax rates
at these levels is preferable to either completely banning all contributions of
the given size or leaving all contributions of the given size unregulated.
Completely banning the donations would create more harm by leading
donors to divert their funds than it would reduce by preventing donors from
contributing above their socially optimal levels. Similarly, leaving all
donations unregulated would create more harm from allowing donors to
contribute above their socially optimal levels than it would reduce by no
longer leading donors to divert their funds. As such, when compared to
78. Wealthy donors may generate more externalities in the form of inequality, and donors
contributing in exchange for corrupt quid pro quo deals may generate more externalities in the
form of corruption. See infra Section II.A. Donors are also likely to differ with respect to
transaction costs. For instance, donors may be more or less concerned about the ethics of diverting
their funds through regulatory loopholes. Donors could also face different costs in determining
how to divert their contributions in the most effective manner.
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contribution ceilings, contribution taxes generate more total surplus and less
overall diversion. These advantages add to the superiority of contribution
taxes under the old model. Given the additional difficulties of-and
potential externalities arising from--diversion, contribution taxes produce
even more additional surplus over contribution ceilings under the new
model than under the old model, by virtue of being able to generate less
overall diversion.
5. Comparing Policy Options with Respect to the Largest and
Smallest Donations
Under the old model, where donors could not divert their funds, an
optimal policy of contribution taxes included a zero-percent tax bracket for
the smallest donations and tax rates effectively reaching 100% for the
largest donations. Factoring in the possibility of diversion does not change
this result with respect to the smallest donations. An optimal policy of
contribution taxes would still include a zero-percent tax rate for any
donations with net positive expected externalities. Since optimal tax rates
are set at the minimum of expected externalities and expected transaction
costs, when expected externalities are below zero, the magnitude of
expected transaction costs is irrelevant. In contrast, factoring in the
possibility of diversion should greatly reduce the subset of the largest
donations where tax rates effectively become 100%.
An optimal policy of contribution taxes sets the tax rates at the
minimum of expected externalities and expected transaction costs. Tax rates
set according to this rule minimize the combined harm from needlessly
eliminating surplus and from diverting funds. We could ignore expected
transaction costs when regulating the smallest donations, where expected
externalities approach zero. But the expected externalities generated by the
largest donations can be very high. Campaign donations are generally
thought to generate increasing marginal externalities. A $10,000 donation is
generally thought to produce far more harm than one thousand $10
donations. In contrast, marginal transaction costs probably decline as
donations grow in size. The transaction costs involved in diverting one
thousand $10 donations are probably much higher than the transaction costs
involved in diverting a single $10,000 donation. Some elements of
transaction costs are likely to be fixed with respect to donation size. The
costs involved in researching how to divert funds or in hiring a lawyer to
advise the transaction may be the same for a $10 diversion as for a $10,000
diversion. Therefore, expected transaction costs are far more likely to be
lower than expected externalities for large donations. Since optimal tax
rates are set at the minimum of expected externalities or expected
transaction costs, factoring in the possibility of diversion causes us to
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reduce the tax rates we impose on the largest contributions. Keeping the tax
rates at the old surplus-maximizing levels would cause many of the largest
donors to divert their funds.
II. RELAXING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL
Under the assumptions of the model presented above, contribution
taxes produce two powerful advantages over contribution ceilings-more
total surplus and less overall diversion. These advantages make out a prima
facie case for replacing contribution ceilings with contribution taxes.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether these advantages hold once I
relax the assumptions of the model. This Part relaxes these assumptions one
by one in order to analyze whether the case for contribution taxes survives
in the real world. Along the way, I attempt to anticipate and respond to
some of the objections likely to be raised against contribution taxes. Still, as
this Note is the first proposal for using corrective taxes in campaign
finance, I can only speculate about what critiques might be levied against
contribution taxes.
Would contribution taxes exacerbate the problems of corruption or
inequality? Are contribution taxes constitutional? Can we actually quantify
the harms caused by donations? In Part I, my assumptions answered these
questions by default. In Part II, I begin the process of examining these
questions. As a result, where Part I relied on fairly rigorous economic
analysis, Part II necessarily engages in more speculative discussions.
A. Relaxing the Assumption of No Correlation
The Assumption of No Correlation dictates the following: Neither the
externalities generated by a contribution, nor the transaction costs
associated with diverting a contribution, are directly correlated with donor
willingness to pay contribution taxes.
Contribution taxes allow individuals with greater private surplus to
make larger contributions; Part I assumed that these individuals do not also
create larger externalities. If private surplus and externalities were strongly
correlated, however, contribution taxes might not result in more social
surplus: Donors with greater private surplus would derive more surplus
from contributing, but they would also generate more externalities.
Similarly, Part I showed that donors with higher private surplus are
more likely to divert their funds, because donors only divert their funds
when private surplus exceeds transaction costs. 79 But if private surplus and
transaction costs were strongly correlated, contribution taxes might result in
79. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
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less diversion. These donors' greater private surplus would make them
more likely to divert their contributions, but their higher transaction costs
would have the opposite effect.80
Hence, relaxing the Assumption of No Correlation could greatly
weaken the case for contribution taxes. I suspect most readers will agree
that donor surplus is probably uncorrelated with transaction costs. 8 1 But I
anticipate many readers will worry about the connection between donor
surplus and the externalities of corruption and inequality-the two harms
generally cited as the reasons we regulate campaign finance. s2
As long as transaction costs and donor surplus are not strongly
correlated, contribution taxes still produce more total surplus and less
overall diversion than contribution ceilings.83 The analysis in Section I.B
does not depend on the relationship between externalities and donor
surplus. A correlation between these factors would not change the
conclusion that contribution taxes strike a better balance between leading
donors to contribute surplus-maximizing amounts and minimizing the
problem of diverted funds.
However, a strong correlation between donor surplus and externalities
might undermine the conclusions from Section I.A. Part I assumed that the
donors who would contribute more generate the same level of externalities
as the donors who would contribute less. Yet if externalities and private
surplus were positively correlated, the donors who generate below-average
externalities would reduce the size of their contributions in response to
contribution taxes by more than the donors who generate above-average
externalities. Thus, the act of taxing donations would raise the expected
level of externalities generated by large donations, and lower the expected
level of externalities generated by small donations.
Still, we might set tax rates equal to the expected externalities
generated at the level donors would actually contribute when faced with the
tax. Raising the tax rates imposed on large donations might increase their
expected level of externalities, but it would also increase the level of the
tax, thereby incorporating such an increase in externalities into the
internalized incentives of high-level donors. Likewise, reducing the tax
rates imposed on small donations might decrease their expected level of
externalities, but it would also decrease the level of the tax in tandem with
these reductions of externalities. Depending on the strength of the
80. Again, this assumes the correlation is positive. A negative correlation would have the
reverse effect.
81. See infra Subsection II.A.3.
82. See David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1369 (1994); Thomas S. Ulen, Money and Politics, 2003 ILL. L. REV. 1037 (reviewing
ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1).
83. This result also assumes that the problem of diverted funds remains a significant source of
concern.
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correlation as compared to the relative magnitudes of externalities and
private surplus, there might be an equilibrium solution where tax rates can
be set equal to the expected externalities generated at the level donors
would contribute when faced with the tax.
84
This Note is not the place for an attempt to measure the actual
magnitude of these factors. 85 Nevertheless, I doubt that donor surplus is
sufficiently correlated with either corruption or inequality to prevent tax
rates from being set equal to the expected externalities generated at the
level donors would actually contribute when faced with the taxes. Even if
this belief is mistaken, we can safely conclude that donor surplus is not
strongly correlated with transaction costs. Hence, contribution taxes remain
superior to contribution ceilings as long as diversion remains a significant
challenge to regulating campaign finance. a6
1. The Harm of Corruption
Most commentators agree that preventing corruption is an important
goal of campaign finance regulation.87 The Supreme Court has even held
that the aims of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption are
the only constitutionally valid justifications for restricting campaign
donations. 88 Nevertheless, "corruption is a notoriously elusive concept." 89
84. Readers versed in economics literature will recognize that the task of setting the tax rates
becomes a form of the adverse selection problem. Restating the question, we need to determine
whether increasing the tax rates to equal expected externalities would raise the level of expected
externalities by more than the tax. This vicious cycle might continue until the optimal tax rates
become zero percent for small donations and 100% (or an amount large enough to prevent all
donors from contributing) for large donations, thus turning our optimal contribution tax into a
contribution ceiling. However, this cycle will be limited by the potential for donors to divert their
funds.
85. For a mathematically rigorous look at the effects of similar correlation on the choice of
pollution control instruments, see Robert N. Stavins, Correlated Uncertainty and Policy
Instrument Choice, 30 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 218 (1996). However, Stavins assumes that
corrective taxes must be linear and his conclusions do not apply when the tax rates can be
graduated. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 9 n.6. I am not aware of any models for
measuring the effects of correlation when tax rates can be graduated. Developing a model of this
sort is well beyond the scope of this Note, and probably beyond my mathematical ability as well.
In any case, a precise model for measuring the effects of correlation would be of only
questionable value when applied to nebulous concepts like corruption and inequality.
86. Even without the vigorous First Amendment rights enforced in American law, diversion
would likely remain a serious concern. For instance, if blocked from making political
advertisements, donors could purchase their own media outlets to spread a message favorable to
candidates, pay for direct-mail campaigns or get-out-the-vote efforts, or otherwise use their
money to influence the political process. See Sullivan, supra note 18, at 687-88.
87. See Strauss, supra note 82, at 1369-70 (recognizing this general consensus, but arguing
that concerns about corruption derive from inequality and the nature of the democratic process).
88. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
496-97 (1985).
89. Lillian R. BeVier, What Ails Us?, 112 YALE L.J. 1135, 1170 (2003) (reviewing
ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1).
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There is substantial disagreement about what it means for a donation to
foster corruption.90 This Note is not the place to delve into that debate. Still,
some readers may worry that contribution taxes would exacerbate the
problem of corruption.
Both contribution ceilings and contribution taxes target corruption by
using a donation's size as a proxy for its tendency to foster corruption.
Contribution ceilings ban all donations larger than the ceiling, and
contribution taxes impose higher tax rates on large contributions. To the
extent that corruption is correlated with contribution size, contribution taxes
can prevent corruption more effectively than can contribution ceilings. 91
But the case for contribution taxes would be weaker if, even after
controlling for contribution size, the degree to which a donation fosters
corruption were positively correlated with donor surplus. Nevertheless, I
am not aware of any studies suggesting such a correlation, and there are
good reasons for doubting that such a correlation exists.92
Certainly, donors who contribute in exchange for large corrupt awards
might be more willing to pay taxes than donors who contribute in exchange
for only moderately sized gains. But donors who contribute out of relatively
benign motives should also be more willing to pay taxes when they care
deeply about the reasons they contribute. The amount a donor is willing to
pay in contribution taxes equals the donor's private surplus, regardless of
whether the donor is pursuing corrupt or benign ends.
Donors can derive substantial surplus from contributions made for
legitimate purposes. For instance, Eugene McCarthy's insurgent campaign
against the Vietnam War was initially financed by a few extremely large
donations.93 Although it can be difficult to separate corrupt contributions
90. On one side of the spectrum, some scholars and early Supreme Court cases present a
relatively narrow view of corruption, including only explicit quid pro quo exchanges. See, e.g.,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics:
A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045
(1985). On the other side of the spectrum, many scholars and recent Court cases advocate a
broader view of corruption, potentially including any donations that distort the political process or
make politicians overly compliant with the interests of large donors. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink
Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990); Lowenstein, supra note 23, at 323.
91. Contribution ceilings generate more errors of overregulation and of underregulation. See
supra Section I.A.
92. Since this Note is the first proposal for contribution taxes, scholars have not previously
had reason to study how donors might respond to a system of contribution taxes. There are studies
examining the characteristics of donors who contribute at given levels under regimes of
contribution ceilings and under unregulated environments. See, e.g., JOHN GREEN ET AL.,
CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, INDIVIDUAL CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTORS:
WEALTHY, CONSERVATIVE AND REFORM-MINDED (1998), at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/
donors/donors.htm. But these studies do not shed light on the question at hand. Studies of this sort
might help with the task of setting contribution tax rates, but they would not aid in determining
whether donor willingness to pay taxes is still correlated with the tendency to produce corruption
after controlling for contribution size.
93. Smith, supra note 17, at 1073.
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from benign ones on a conceptual level, antiwar donations to a long shot
like Eugene McCarthy should fit comfortably on the benign side of the
spectrum. Similarly, in the current election cycle, as of November 2003,
George Soros and Peter Lewis had each pledged about $10 million to fund
independent expenditures against President Bush.94 Considering that Bush's
opponent had yet to be named, these donors were probably motivated more
by ideology than by a desire for influence.95 We can only guess how these
donors would respond to contribution taxes, but at least some relatively
benign donors should be willing to increase the amount they contribute
when faced with taxes.
More generally, donors frequently express passionate commitment to
ideological causes.96 Replacing contribution ceilings with contribution taxes
might make it easier for donors to gain influence through large
contributions, but it would also make it easier for ideological crusaders to
assist candidates who support their crusades. We lack the information
necessary for determining which of these groups would be more willing to
pay taxes. Recent empirical studies suggest most donors treat political
contributions more like charitable donations than like business
investments. 97 These results hold equally true both for large donors such as
top corporate executives and for small donors.98 Ultimately, we can only
speculate about the connection between corruption and donor willingness to
pay taxes. But the current state of empirical research does not support the
proposition that these factors are strongly correlated.
Moreover, even if these factors were strongly correlated, contribution
taxes might still reduce corruption more effectively than contribution
ceilings. For example, imagine that all relatively benign donors greatly
decrease the amount they contribute in the face of taxes, leaving only
extremely corrupt donors to contribute large amounts. For simplicity,
imagine all corrupt donors seek exemptions from antipollution laws. Even
if the pollution were to harm society in the amount of $10,000 per donor,
not all donors would receive the same private benefit from being able to
94. Glen Justice, A Hard Road for Democrats in a Day of No 'Soft Money, 'N.Y. TiMES, Nov.
20, 2003, at A27.
95. One could characterize nearly any contribution as a pursuit of influence. Still, at a
minimum, these contributions were probably not exchanged for quid pro quo promises.
96. GREEN ET AL., supra note 92 (claiming that "ideologues," or donors especially motivated
by ideology, "are among the most active contributors").
97. See id. (indicating that only 29% of donors contribute to pursue "instrumental goals");
Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Winter 2003, at 105.
98. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 97, at 117-19 (showing that top corporate executives give
"about 0.05 percent of their annual compensation to political campaigns" and arguing that this
level of giving indicates that donors are motivated by consumption motives rather than by motives
more akin to business investments).
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pollute.99 If we set the tax rates equal to the $10,000 harm, only the donors
whose profits from polluting exceeded the costs would gain the right to
pollute. As these donors would compensate society for the harm they cause
through their taxes, everyone would benefit from allowing these donors to
contribute. 00 Even when all relatively benign donors have low willingness
to pay taxes, contribution taxes can still be more effective at reducing
corruption than contribution ceilings. Contribution taxes are more effective
as long as tax rates can be set equal to the expected externalities generated
at the levels donors would actually contribute when faced with the tax.' 01
The above example might come out differently if we assumed a perfect
correlation between donor willingness to pay taxes and the harm from
corruption. If the donors who profited the most from polluting also
generated the most harm, it might become impossible to set tax rates equal
to the expected externalities generated at the levels donors would actually
contribute. However, considering the variety of forms corruption can take,
it seems unlikely that corruption and private benefit would be so strongly
correlated as to make it impossible to set tax rates equal to expected
externalities for every possible donation size. There is room for a great deal
more empirical work on the connection between corruption and donor
willingness to pay taxes. But even ignoring the effects of diverted funds, we
have reason for optimism that contribution taxes can more effectively
regulate corruption than contribution ceilings.
2. The Harm of Inequality
After corruption, the desire to limit inequality is the main justification
cited for regulating campaign donations. 10 2 Any regulatory system that
99. Not all donors interested in polluting will be in the same market with respect to end
goods. Hence, end prices and profits are likely to differ.
Of course, donors will often seek to rewrite major areas of legislation rather than secure
individual exemptions from the laws. But the principle from the above example still applies.
Imagine that three groups of donors-donors seeking to rewrite the Clean Air Act, donors seeking
lax securities law enforcement, and donors seeking to repeal worker safety laws-would all cause
$1 million of harm if allowed to donate in pursuit of their legislative ends. Setting the tax rates
equal to $1 million would lead only those groups whose private benefit exceeds net externalities
to contribute. Setting the individual tax rates to reflect the harm caused by the group in
equilibrium is a more difficult problem than the simple example above, but the principle that
private surplus and the harm from corruption are not likely to be perfectly correlated still applies.
100. This result might not hold if corruption or other obstacles prevented us from using the
tax revenue to compensate those harmed by the corruption. But the contribution taxes would still
be efficient in a Kaldor-Hicks sense.
101. Alternatively, ignoring the effects of diverted funds, contribution taxes would be
equivalent to contribution ceilings if these tax rates ended up being either 0% or 100% (or an
amount effectively equaling 100%) for all donation sizes.
102. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 17, at 1049; Strauss, supra note 82, at 1369. Scholars and
policy advocates frequently design campaign finance regulations based, at least partially, on a
desire to limit inequality. See, e.g., David Adamany, PAC's and the Democratic Financing of
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permits private donations will generate some measure of inequality. 0 3
Supreme Court precedent prevents us from setting tax rates based on a
donor's wealth. 10 4 Hence, both contribution ceilings and contribution taxes
target inequality by using a donation's size as a proxy for the degree to
which it generates inequality. 1
05
All else being equal, wealthy donors can afford to pay higher taxes than
poor donors. Nevertheless, the relationship between a donor's wealth and
the degree to which her contribution fosters inequality is not as clear as it
might seem. Numerous scholars have written about the harm of inequality
in campaign finance. Those who believe that inequality is a serious problem
frequently describe the harm as a violation of the one-person, one-vote
principle,'0 6 or of the notion that "wealthy citizens should not be permitted
to have a greater ability to participate in the electoral process simply on
account of their greater wealth."' 10 7 These scholars all speak of the
inequality generated from "large contributions by wealthy individuals."' l08
Yet none of these scholars takes a position on whether inequality is created
by the fact that these contributions are large or by the fact that the wealthy
are doing the contributing.
To the extent that the harm of inequality arises from the size of a
contribution, we can counteract the harm by setting tax rates equal to
expected externalities. This result only becomes problematic if the harm of
inequality comes from the fact that it is the wealthy who contribute large
sums, rather than from the fact that large sums are contributed.109 Scholars
of inequality seldom consider whether donor wealth affects the inequality
resulting from a donation, because such a question is irrelevant for their
purposes. 10 Yet answering this question is essential to determining whether
Politics, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 569 (1980); Joel L. Fleishman & Pope McCorkle, Level-Up Rather than
Level-Down: Towards a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J.L. & POL. 211 (1984);
J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to
Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982).
103. Wealthy donors can afford to make even small donations more easily than less wealthy
donors.
104. The Court has repeatedly held that inequality is not a constitutionally valid target of
campaign finance reform. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 426 n.7 (1988); Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1981); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
Although these cases all deal with ceilings rather than taxes, they would probably prohibit wealth-
based taxes as well.
105. If Congress actually followed the Court, contribution ceilings might not target inequality
at all. However, at least a few legislators must have thought about inequality when determining
the level of contribution ceilings to support.
106. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 82, at 1382.
107. Foley, supra note 8, at 1204.
108. Strauss, supra note 82, at 1387.
109. By "large sums" I mean any donation large enough to generate inequality. Hence, even
"small" donations of $100 or less might qualify.
110. This question has been ignored largely because it does not affect the degree to which
inequality justifies a policy of contribution ceilings or public financing. These policies reduce
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contribution ceilings or contribution taxes are more effective at limiting
inequality.
At some level, a donor's wealth probably does influence the degree to
which her contribution generates inequality. Consider two different
contributions of $1000, the first made by a poor donor who becomes so
inspired by a candidate that she decides to contribute her entire life savings
to his campaign, the second made by a wealthy businessperson who
regularly donates large amounts to political campaigns. I expect many
readers would argue that the second contribution creates more problems of
inequality than the first."' Since rich donors will generally be more willing
to pay contribution taxes than poor and middle-class donors, we might be
tempted to conclude that contribution taxes exacerbate the problem of
inequality.
Yet this conclusion would ignore the fact that poor and middle-class
donors do not generally contribute at the levels affected by the choice
between contribution taxes and contribution ceilings. 1 2 If our current
regulatory system set contribution ceilings at $100, it might be argued that
moving to a regime of contribution taxes could harm the poor and middle
class. But this argument simply does not apply to replacing contribution
ceilings set at $2000 or larger." 3 Poor and middle-class Americans almost
never make contributions of that size. Although contribution taxes would
also tax donations smaller than $2000, the poor and middle class would still
be largely unaffected by the taxes. 1
4
inequality regardless of whether the inequality is caused by the size of large contributions or by
the fact that it is the wealthy who do the contributing. In contrast, replacing contribution ceilings
with contribution taxes reduces the average size of large contributions without reducing the
overall ability of the wealthy to contribute.
111. I could plausibly argue that inequality is only a function of donation size. For instance, a
donation might only produce inequality to the extent that other donors do not make equivalently
sized donations of their own. A strict adherence to the principle of one-person, one-vote might
lead us to be equally concerned when one donor contributes more than another out of a greater
interest in politics and when the donor contributes more due to her greater wealth. According to
this logic, a $1000 donation could generate the same amount of inequality regardless of whether it
was made by a millionaire or a poor donor contributing her entire life savings. However, I
personally find arguments of this sort unpersuasive, and I anticipate many readers will share my
skepticism.
112. A survey of donors in the 1996 congressional elections found that 78% of the donors
who contributed $200 or more had family incomes in excess of $100,000. Peter Francia
et al., Donor Dissent: Congressional Contributors Rethink Giving, PUB. PERSP., July-Aug. 2000,
at 29, 30.
113. Our current regulatory system caps donations from individuals to candidates at $2000
and most other forms of donations at much higher levels. See Corrado, supra note 14 (manuscript
at 46-47); supra text accompanying notes 9-14.
114. If the zero-percent tax bracket extended to $200, for example, less that one-quarter of
the donors affected by the contribution tax would likely have family incomes of less than a
$100,000. See Francia et al., supra note 112, at 30. Most of these donors would be taxed at low
marginal rates. In contrast, 96% of the donors who contribute a total amount of $8000 or more
have family incomes in excess of $100,000. Id. These donors would likely be taxed at much
higher levels.
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Indeed, replacing contribution ceilings with contribution taxes might
enhance the influence of poor and middle-class donors. An optimal policy
of contribution taxes would almost certainly include a zero-percent tax
bracket for small donations and tax larger donations at increasingly
graduated rates." 15 As such, the small and medium-sized donations typically
made by the poor and middle class would be left untaxed or only minimally
taxed. In contrast, the large donations typically made by the wealthy would
be taxed at much higher rates. Replacing contribution ceilings with
contribution taxes might enhance the influence of superwealthy donors,
who are able to increase the size of their contributions by more than the
amount of the tax. Yet this increased influence would come at the expense
of the moderately wealthy donors who previously contributed around the
level of the contribution ceilings. If the tax rates are set appropriately, poor
and middle-class donors should not lose influence as compared to the entire
class of wealthy and superwealthy donors.' 16
Consequently, the real question in analyzing whether private surplus is
correlated with inequality is whether a $1000 contribution is more harmful
when made by a donor in the top one-percent income bracket as opposed to
a donor in the top five-percent income bracket.' 1 7 Controlling for
contribution size, are donations by the superwealthy more likely to foster
inequality than donations by the merely wealthy? Unfortunately, the
existing accounts of inequality do not answer these questions, and a
thorough discussion of the relationship between equality and campaign
finance is well beyond the scope of this Note.
Still, I suspect that those whose concern is inequality are not thinking
about distributional issues between the wealthy and the superwealthy.
Intuitively, the concern that donors in the top five-percent income bracket
might lose influence to donors in the top one-percent income bracket does
not strike me as a sufficient reason for rejecting a reform proposal that
would otherwise benefit society as a whole. One reason we might be
concerned about redistributing power from the wealthy to the superwealthy
is the fear that a small group of donors could gain disproportionate
influence over the political process, thereby distorting policy outcomes
further away from the preferences of the public at large. However,
115. See supra Subsection I.A.5.
116. Assuming the poor and middle class at least partially benefit from the tax revenue, they
should enjoy a net gain from replacing contribution ceilings with contribution taxes. In colloquial
terms, contribution taxes "enlarge the total pie" while maintaining the "share of the pie" enjoyed
by poor and middle-class donors. Even if we view campaign donations as a zero-sum game, the
poor and middle class would still benefit as the superwealthy paid to gain influence at the expense
of the merely wealthy.
117. The top five-percent income bracket consists of Americans with family incomes in
excess of $100,000. LIOZ, supra note 52, at 17. This seems like a reasonable cutoff point
for labeling donors as "wealthy" but not "superwealthy." My decision to label donors in the top
one-percent income bracket as superwealthy is completely arbitrary.
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redistributing political influence from the wealthy to the superwealthy
would not necessarily distort policy outcomes in this fashion.
A redistribution of this sort might even bring policy outcomes more
into line with the preferences of the general population. Empirical studies
have demonstrated that, as a class, "large contributors are not representative
of the general population; they are more conservative than the public at
large on a variety of issues ranging from environmental protection to taxes,
health care, and poverty reduction programs."'1 18 Whereas the general
voting public is more or less evenly split between Democrats and
Republicans, donors are far more likely to be Republican," 9 and
Republicans enjoy significant fundraising advantages over Democrats. 120
To the extent we can characterize the preferences of superwealthy donors,
they do not appear to share the biases of large donors as a whole. According
to Bradley Smith, "Historically, candidates with large constituencies among
the poor and the working class have obtained their campaign funds from a
small base of wealthy donors.",12 1 Although some superwealthy donors
contribute large sums to Republicans,12 2 as a class, the superwealthy appear
to contribute more to Democrats.1 23 Indeed, to the extent Democrats have
been able to maintain fundraising parity, they have been far more dependent
on soft money and other methods of evading the caps on direct
contributions.1 24 We might think of the superwealthy as being relatively
idiosyncratic in the causes they support. To the extent this is true, any
advantage the superwealthy enjoy as a class on account of their greater
ability to contribute could be offset by the tendency of their contributions to
work at cross-purposes. As David Strauss writes, "To the extent that the
problem of inequality is that Hollywood stars make contributions so that
candidates will promote environmental causes, that is not obviously a
118. Id. at 7.
119. GREEN ET AL., supra note 92 (showing that only 31% of donors contributing $200 or
more are "liberal Democrats" or "other liberals/Democrats" while 49% are "conservative
Republicans" or "other conservatives/Republicans").
120. Lowenstein, supra note 23, at 362.
121. Smith, supra note 17, at 1082.
122. For instance, Carl Linder has already contributed $2.5 million to President Bush. Kelley
Beaucar Vlahos, Billionaires Bundle Funds for Democrats, Fox NEWS CHANNEL, Nov. 28, 2003,
at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,104352,00.html.
123. One Republican fundraiser was quoted as saying "we don't have any billionaire
conservatives like the billionaire liberals." Id. More generally, 50% of donors contributing
between $200 and $8000 contribute to Republicans, as compared to 31% to Democrats; 64% of
those same donors have family incomes of between $100,000 and $500,000. In comparison, only
31% of donors contributing more than $8000 contribute to Republicans, as compared to 50% to
Democrats; 52% of these donors have family incomes in excess of $500,000. Francia et al., supra
note 112, at 30.
124. Justice, supra note 94 (explaining that in the previous election cycle, Democrats
received 56% of their contributions from soft money as compared to 39% for Republicans, and
that Democrats have turned to other forms of diverted funds in the face of the BCRA's soft money
ban).
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problem that needs to be remedied, whether or not the contributions are
offset by those of wealthy business executives opposed to environmental
regulation.' 25
I do not intend to argue in favor of redistributing influence from the
wealthy to the superwealthy. Nor do I mean to suggest that we should favor
contribution taxes out of a desire to help the Democratic Party or other
liberal causes. I think it is far from clear how contribution taxes would
affect the political parties and related interest groups. In any case, I would
hope that partisan motives are not our primary criterion for evaluating
campaign finance reform proposals. 126 My only goal in this discussion has
been to question the notion that contribution taxes would exacerbate the
problem of political inequality. Redistributing influence from the wealthy to
the superwealthy is probably not desirable, but it should not overpower the
advantages of replacing contribution ceilings with contribution taxes. There
is room for a great deal more work on the relationship between donor
wealth, contribution size, and inequality. However, based on the
information we do have, it does not seem that there should be a strong
correlation between the harm of inequality and donor willingness to pay
taxes. These factors may be somewhat correlated, but the correlation is
probably not strong enough to prevent us from setting tax rates equal to the
expected externalities generated at the levels at which donors would
actually contribute when faced with the tax. Hence, even ignoring the
effects of diverted funds, contribution taxes can probably limit inequality
more effectively than contribution ceilings.
3. The Effect of Transaction Costs
I doubt many readers will object to my claim that donor surplus is
uncorrelated-or not strongly correlated-with transaction costs. Compared
to corruption and inequality, transaction costs are far less likely to vary
across individual donors. The factors influencing transaction costs are
largely external to donors. 127 Still, donors probably differ somewhat with
respect to transaction costs.
Some donors may find it less costly to acquire the information needed
to divert their funds effectively. Wealthy donors may have better access to
campaign finance lawyers, and donors who care more about politics may be
more aware of opportunities for diverting funds. Yet this relationship would
125. Strauss, supra note 82, at 1388.
126. For a discussion of how partisan and political motives affect the debate over campaign
finance reform, see Lowenstein, supra note 23.
127. For instance, some of the most important components of transaction costs arise from
legal rules against coordination. However, this conclusion does not apply to the costs related to a
donor's access to information about diversion and attitudes about the appropriateness of such
diversion.
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strengthen the case for contribution taxes. Wealth and interest in politics are
positively correlated with donor surplus. To the extent these donors are both
more willing to pay taxes and more likely to divert their funds, contribution
taxes would be preferred still more over contribution ceilings.
Alternatively, independent expenditures might be more effective at
supporting the causes of some donors over others. And donors might differ
in whether they care about moral arguments against diverting funds. But if
these factors are strongly correlated with donor willingness to pay taxes, I
fail to see why. I would welcome empirical studies to investigate these
connections, but I feel safe in concluding that donor surplus is not strongly
correlated with transaction costs.'
128
Consequently, the case for contribution taxes survives even if donor
surplus is perfectly correlated with corruption and inequality. Contribution
taxes produce more total surplus and less overall diversion even when the
tax rates cannot be set equal to expected externalities. In contrast to tax
rates set at either zero or 100% (a contribution ceiling), tax rates set equal
to expected transaction costs strike a better balance between maximizing
surplus and minimizing the problem of diverted funds. 129 As compared to
contribution ceilings, contribution taxes more effectively mitigate
externalities like corruption and inequality, while leading fewer donors to
divert their funds. A correlation between private surplus and externalities
might weaken the case for contribution taxes, but contribution taxes would
remain superior to contribution ceilings.
B. Relaxing the Assumption of Constitutionality
The Assumption of Constitutionality does just what it says: It assumes
the constitutionality of contribution taxes as a method of regulating
campaign donations.
Campaign finance is a highly unsettled area of the law. It can be
extremely difficult to predict how the Court will react to a novel method of
regulation. The constitutionality of contribution ceilings was established in
Buckley, 130 and has been reaffirmed in a series of cases since.13 1 But the
Court has never reviewed a policy similar to contribution taxes. As such,
we can only speculate how the Court would respond to a contribution tax
128. Or, if these factors are correlated, the correlation would be negative and would thus
strengthen the case for contribution taxes.
129. See supra Section I.B.
130. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
131. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000); Austin v. Mich.
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990). While the Supreme Court's recent
decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003), has placed some
of the precedents cited in this Section in doubt, I do not expect that my conclusions will be
affected by this ruling.
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regime. Still, based on the logic of its prior cases, it seems unlikely that the
Court would hold a system of contribution taxes unconstitutional.
The Court typically grants Congress wide latitude in designing systems
of taxation,132 but campaign contributions are protected First Amendment
activities.' 33 Congress retains broad discretion to tax First Amendment
freedoms as long as the tax is part of a broad-based tax scheme, 134 or is a
nominal fee used to defray the cost of administering the First Amendment
activity in question.1 35 Neither of these principles holds for contribution
taxes. Contribution taxes both intentionally discriminate against political
donors and generate more revenue than is strictly needed to administer the
donation process. 136
Consequently, contribution taxes will be subjected to a heightened
standard of review.1 37 "[I]f a tax singles out and burdens freedoms protected
by the First Amendment, the tax is unconstitutional 'unless the State asserts
a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve
without differential taxation.""'38 This rule originates from the landmark
Minneapolis Star case, in which the Court struck down a tax on newspaper
publishing. According to Minneapolis Star, First Amendment activities can
be taxed in order to achieve a sufficiently important state interest, but the
government's need to raise revenue, by itself, does not qualify as such an
interest.139 Although raising revenue is an important government interest,
the state has other means for raising revenue that do not differentially
restrict First Amendment freedoms. Hence, contribution taxes can only be
constitutional if they further a sufficiently important government interest
other than raising revenue.
This rule of heightened scrutiny might pose a serious problem for
contribution taxes, except that contribution ceilings were upheld using the
132. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 57 (rev. 4th ed. 2002) ("[T]here are few serious procedural or
substantive constitutional impediments on congressional power in enacting tax legislation.
Exceptions occur only when the tax law interferes with such fundamental rights as the freedoms
of speech or religion granted by the First Amendment.").
133. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14; see also BeVier, supra note 90; J. Skelly Wright, Politics and
the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976); Note, Regulation of Campaign
Contributions: Maintaining the Integrity of the Political Process Through an Appearance of
Fairness, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 677-81 (1983).
134. See Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987) ("[A] genuinely
nondiscriminatory tax on the receipts of newspapers would be constitutionally permissible ... 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 n.9 (1983).
135. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941).
136. Although corrective contribution taxes are not intended to be revenue-maximizing, the
tax rates will undoubtedly be much higher than they would need to be if our only goal was to
collect sufficient revenue to defray administrative costs such as the costs of running the FEC.
137. See Vt. Soc'y of Ass'n Executives v. Milne, 779 A.2d 20, 23 (Vt. 2001) ("[I]f plaintiffs
are correct that §264a is a special tax burdening First Amendment interests, we apply a heightened
standard of review ... ").
138. Id. at 26 (quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585).
139. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 586.
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same rule. 140 According to Lillian BeVier, "The Court has suggested that
[limitations on independent expenditures] should receive strict first
amendment scrutiny .... Contribution limitations, however, may evoke
less first amendment concern."' 141 In Buckley, the Court held that although
"contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First
Amendment interests,.., expenditure ceilings impose significantly more
severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression
and association than do... limitations on financial contributions.' 42
Contribution ceilings are not held to a standard of strict scrutiny because the
Court feels that contributions contain only some elements of political
communication. Specifically, the Buckley Court rejected the notion that the
indirect speech of campaign contributions deserves the same protection as
the direct speech of independent expenditures.143 The same rationale applies
to contribution taxes. Contribution taxes are only constitutionally suspect to
the extent that campaign contributions are protected First Amendment
activities. As such, Buckley's holding that limitations on campaign
contributions are more permissible than limitations on independent
expenditures applies equally to contribution taxes as to contribution
ceilings. Both contribution ceilings and contribution taxes are
constitutionally valid if and only if "the State demonstrates a sufficiently
important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment" of donors' First Amendment freedoms. 144 Neither policy is
constitutional unless it furthers a compelling state interest, and any interest
that justifies one policy should also justify the other.
Both contribution ceilings and contribution taxes are justified by the
government's interest in preventing "corruption and the appearance of
corruption."'' 45 In the Court's own words,
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political
quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity
of our system of representative democracy is undermined....
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption
140. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1976) (per curiam).
141. BeVier, supra note 90, at 1051.
142. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.
143. See id. at 21 ("While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a
candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor."). For a critique of this
view, see BeVier, supra note 90, at 1062-65. For an argument in support of this view, see
Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the
Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (1980).
144. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
145. Id.
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stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions....
We find that, under the rigorous standard of review established
by our prior decisions, the weighty interests served by restricting
the size of financial contributions to political candidates are
sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment
freedoms caused by ... contribution ceiling[s].
146
Yet contribution taxes are more effective at preventing corruption than
are contribution ceilings. If preventing corruption were our only concern,
we would ban all private donations. Instead, we try to balance the goal of
preventing corruption against our desire to maintain the benefits of private
donations. Contribution taxes can strike this balance more effectively than
contribution ceilings.
Moreover, contribution taxes preserve more opportunities for
conveying the intensity of a donor's support. A $10 donation might
communicate support for a candidate, but it would not communicate the
same intensity of support as a $10,000 donation. 47 In the words of Judge
J. Skelly Wright, "[A] government which hopes to maintain stability must
preserve for its citizens some means of demonstrating intensity of
feeling.' ' 148 Compared to the gradual limits of contribution taxes, the all-or-
nothing formula of contribution ceilings is far more restrictive of a donor's
ability to convey the intensity of her support. Under a system of
contribution ceilings, donors who contribute at the level of the ceiling
cannot increase the size of their donations. Contribution ceilings lead
numerous donors to contribute the exact amount of the ceiling. 49 As a
result, donors find it more difficult to use the size of their donations to
communicate different levels of support. For example, if a donor regularly
contributes the maximum amount to candidates, she cannot contribute more
to a particularly favored candidate in order to express an extra level of
146. Id. at 26-29.
147. According to Buckley, the fact that contribution ceilings prevent a donor from conveying
the full intensity of her support is not a ground for holding them unconstitutional. See id. at 21.
But the ability of a contribution tax to limit corruption without impinging on this intensity remains
a real benefit.
148. Wright, supra note 133, at 1013-14. Of course, the size of a contribution reflects a
donor's wealth in addition to the intensity of her beliefs. But intensity of beliefs is still conveyed
through contribution size, and contribution ceilings prevent some donors from communicating the
intensity of their convictions by increasing the size of their contributions.
149. See, e.g., REFORM VOTER PROJECT, THE NUMBERS TELL THE STORY: BUSH/CHENEY
'04 INC. RELIES HEAVILY ON LARGE DONATIONS 5 (2003), http://www.campaignmoney.org/
factsheets/bushreliesheavily/bushrelies03.pdf(showing that, in the second quarter of 2004, 82% of
the money donated to the Bush/Cheney campaign in increments of $200 or more came from
donations of exactly $2000).
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support. In contrast, the graduated limits of contribution taxes make it easy
for donors to differentiate the size of their donations. Under a regime of
contribution taxes, individuals would find it easier to convey the intensity
of their support. 1
50
Consequently, contribution taxes can limit corruption more effectively
than contribution ceilings while preserving more opportunities for political
expression. Since contribution ceilings are constitutionally justified by the
goal of reducing corruption and the appearance of corruption, contribution
taxes should be constitutional as well.
Another way of viewing this argument is to examine the effects both
policies have on individual donors. Contribution ceilings prevent all donors
from making donations larger than the ceiling. Essentially, contribution
ceilings place a 100% tax on these extremely large donations. Contribution
taxes also limit these large donations, but with tax rates lower than 100%.
Hence, contribution taxes place weaker restrictions on large donations than
do contribution ceilings. If the Constitution permits us to completely
ban these large donations, it should also permit us to tax them at rates
below 100%.
Contribution taxes might also limit smaller donations that are not
currently restricted by contribution ceilings. 15' However, the Court does not
second-guess Congress's judgment as to how restrictive contribution
ceilings should be. As the Court ruled in Buckley, once it is "'satisfied that
some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe,
whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000.' Such
distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be said to
amount to differences in kind."'' 52 Based on this logic, Congress could have
150. Only the wealthy are likely to be affected by contribution ceilings set at their current
levels. See supra Subsection II.A.2. This fact may reduce the force of my argument, but should
not defeat it. The wealthy also deserve the right to express the intensity of their support through
differentiated contribution sizes.
151. The zero-percent tax bracket of a contribution tax schedule should probably not extend
all the way to $1000-the level of the cap on donations from individuals to political candidates
that the Court found constitutionally acceptable in Buckley.
152. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1975))
(citation omitted). Like large donations, small donations can foster corruption or the appearance of
corruption. By bundling large numbers of small donations into a single package, donors can
obtain the same influence from small donations as from large ones. Many bundlers solicit
donations from "employees, suppliers, subcontractors, clients and others" with economic ties to
the bundler. Thomas B. Edsall, Campaign Financing Reshaped: Bush Edge Making Public Funds
Moot, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2003, at Al. Donors might find it more costly to corrupt politicians
through bundles of small donations. If large donations are subject to high taxes while small ones
are immune from taxation, however, donors may decide to bear these costs. Congress might try to
make bundling more difficult, but Congress cannot stop groups of donors from informing
candidates that their contributions are intended to achieve the same end or from nominating a
spokesperson to represent their collective interests.
Small donations can thus generate the same corruption as large ones. It is true that a single
$1000 donation is not likely to corrupt a federal politician. Yet, as with smaller donations, the
corrupting power of $1000 donations arises from the potential for bundling numerous
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set contribution ceilings well below the $1000 level.153 Consequently, the
Court should still uphold contribution taxes that limit donations smaller
than $1000, as long as the limitations are not so severe as to constitute a
difference "in kind," rather than a difference in degree. 1
54
Overall then, there is some risk that the Court would hold contribution
taxes unconstitutional. Unlike contribution ceilings, the Court has never
reviewed a policy similar to contribution taxes. We can only speculate how
the Court would respond. Still, the Court's current jurisprudence suggests
that contribution taxes should be constitutionally acceptable.
C. Relaxing the Assumption of Perfect Implementation
The Assumption of Perfect Implementation amounts to this:
Policymakers can and will set tax rates at socially optimal levels.
The first question under this assumption is whether policymakers can
set tax rates appropriately-do policymakers have the information needed
to set tax rates at their socially optimal rates? In order to set tax rates
correctly, policymakers need to estimate the level of expected externalities
and transaction costs generated by donations of various sizes. This task is
particularly difficult because there is wide disagreement about what
constitute the harms and benefits of campaign donations.155 Moreover, the
expected magnitude of these factors may change between election cycles
and even within an election cycle. Campaign finance is a fluid enterprise
and the social consequences of donating to a candidate are likely to change
depending on which candidates are running for office, how the candidates
use their campaign funds, how many other donors are also making political
donations, and numerous other factors. If the tax rates are set incorrectly,
we cannot guarantee the superiority of contribution taxes over contribution
ceilings.
However, policymakers also need to estimate the expected level of
externalities and transaction costs when setting contribution ceilings. In
fact, policymakers need more information to set optimal contribution
ceilings than they need to set optimal contribution taxes.' 56 In addition to
contributions of this size into a coordinated attempt to gain influence. See Lowenstein, supra note
23, at 357. Consequently, the difference between taxing $1000 donations and $250 donations is a
difference in degree, not a difference in kind.
153. For a discussion of the minimum permissible limits for setting contribution ceilings, see
William J. Connolly, Note, How Low Can You Go? State Campaign Contribution Limits and the
First Amendment, 76 B.U. L. REV. 483 (1996).
154. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.
155. Consider, for example, the debate about what constitutes corruption. See supra note 90.
156. For an analogous argument in reference to pollution taxes, see Cooter, supra note 44, at
1550-51 ("To compute the efficient tax, government officials must know the amount of external
harm caused by the polluter and nothing more. By contrast, to discover the efficient standard,
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information on externalities and transaction costs, setting an optimal
contribution ceiling requires information on donor surplus. 157 To the extent
that policymakers lack perfect information about donor surplus, they will
find it more difficult to set an optimal policy of contribution ceilings than
an optimal policy of contribution taxes.
A critic might argue that setting the level of contribution ceilings only
requires estimates for donations sized around the level of the ceiling, while
setting efficient tax rates requires estimates across the entire range of
donation sizes. After all, a contribution ceiling is a single limit while
contribution taxes require a comprehensive schedule of tax rates. However,
it is hard to imagine policymakers being able to estimate the harms and
benefits from a contribution of a specific size without also having some
information about the harms generated by larger and smaller donations.
Even if policymakers lack good information about donations in a certain
size range, this does not justify using contribution ceilings as a default. In
effect, contribution ceilings give policymakers a binary choice between
setting tax rates at 100% or 0%. The first choice blocks all donations that
create net benefits in addition to the donations that generate net harms; the
second choice permits all donations generating net harms in addition to
those generating net benefits. If we have reason to believe that all donations
above a certain size generate net harms or that all donations below a given
size generate net benefits, we can supplement our regime of contribution
taxes with a 100% or a 0% tax bracket. But in the absence of information,
we are no better off setting tax rates at 100% or 0% than we would be
splitting the difference. If policymakers have any information, no matter
how poor, they are better off estimating an appropriate tax rate than setting
the default rate at 100% or 0%. It is not easy to determine an optimal
system of contribution taxes, but it is even harder to set levels for an
optimal system of contribution ceilings.
The second part of the Assumption of Perfect Implementation asks
whether policymakers will set tax rates at appropriate levels. Policymakers
are motivated by more than just the abstract pursuit of the public good.
When evaluating a proposal for campaign finance reform, legislators may
be influenced by parochial concerns such as how the proposal will affect
their electoral chances or those of their party. Hence, policymakers may
structure systems for regulating campaign finance based on hidden
agendas-purposes other than their publicly declared goals such as
officials must balance the external harm against the cost of abatement, which requires complete
information on each polluter's abatement technology.").
157. Whereas optimal contribution tax rates are set equal to the minimum of expected
externalities and expected transaction costs, optimal contribution ceilings are set at the expected
point where donor surplus exceeds the minimum of externalities or transaction costs by the
maximum possible amount.
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reducing corruption or promoting equality. 5 8 This concern is particularly
worrisome when the specific measures in question lack salience with the
general public. If voters do not realize that measures are designed for
purposes other than improving our system of campaign finance, politicians
cannot be held accountable for promoting their hidden, agendas.
Consequently, one argument against contribution taxes claims that tax
rates are less salient than ceilings. A $2000 ceiling on contributions is much
easier to understand than a graduated schedule for tax rates with numerous
tax brackets. Arguably, voters could find it more difficult to understand
contribution taxes and politicians could find it easier to adjust tax rates to
advance their hidden agendas.
A related argument worries that contribution taxes grant politicians
more flexibility in promoting their hidden agendas. Whereas a contribution
ceiling can only be raised or lowered, a tax schedule can also be altered in a
number of additional ways. The tax rate for each bracket can be raised or
lowered, and the overall tax schedule can be made more or less graduated.
As Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres argue in critiquing a system of
subsidies, "specifying the precise formula would provoke a partisan battle
royal-with Democrats and Republicans fiercely manipulating the subsidy
schedule to their partisan advantage.... [T]he parties would be tempted to
revisit the issue and rejigger the formula constantly to reflect changes in the
political balance of forces." 159 By giving politicians more variables to fight
over, contribution taxes could result in more partisan warfare.
Yet both of these arguments rely on an unrealistic picture of our current
system of contribution ceilings. Contribution ceilings are neither simple nor
transparent. While it is convenient to think of the ceilings as consisting of a
single $2000 limit on contributions from donors to candidates, there are
numerous additional rules and regulations governing transactions of all
kinds.160 Politicians might alter any of these provisions in the search for
personal or partisan advantage. Replacing the ceilings with taxes would not
significantly change this situation. Indeed, nearly all of the partisan dispute
in recent years has been over regulating nonstandard forms of donations.
The recent Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act did raise the level of
the contribution ceiling on donations from individuals to candidates
158. For instance, opponents of contribution ceilings frequently worry that campaign finance
regulations are designed to protect incumbents against challengers. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at
251 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 41.
160. To provide just a few examples, our current system of contribution ceilings caps
individuals' donations to national party committees at $25,000 per election cycle. 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 441a(a)(I)(B) (West 2003). An individual's donations to state and local party committees are
capped at $10,000 per election cycle. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(D). An individual's donations to PACs are
capped at $5000 per election cycle, id. § 441a(a)(1)(C), and an individual's total hard money
donations may not exceed $95,000 per election cycle, id. § 441 a(a)(3).
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from $1000 to $2000, but this change came almost as an afterthought
to the fierce disputes over limiting soft money and electioneering
communications. 161
Overall then, contribution taxes may be slightly more prone to political
manipulation. The details of implementing a system of contribution taxes
may be somewhat more complicated than the details of implementing a
system of contribution ceilings. But considering how complicated the
details of contribution ceilings already are, the marginal added complexity
that might result from replacing contribution ceilings with contribution
taxes should not significantly change the overall picture. Hence,
contribution taxes should not result in significantly more political
manipulation than contribution ceilings. Political manipulation is a fact of
democratic government and should not be seen as a unique disadvantage of
contribution taxes. Contribution taxes will not be implemented in a perfect
fashion, but there is no reason to think that our current implementation of
contribution ceilings is any more perfect.
CONCLUSION
It is time for campaign finance scholars to consider incentive-based
regulations. Contribution taxes might not be a panacea for all our campaign
finance ills, but they have enough potential to merit a thorough debate. This
Note is an attempt to spark that debate by presenting the initial case for
contribution taxes.
To this end, I have argued that, compared to contribution ceilings,
contribution taxes produce more total surplus and less overall diversion. I
have also responded to the potential objections that contribution taxes
would exacerbate the problems of corruption and inequality, be held
unconstitutional, or result in the tax rates being set incorrectly. A great deal
more remains to be said on these issues. Nevertheless, I believe my
arguments constitute a prima facie case for contribution taxes. I leave it to
future papers to expand the parameters of this debate.
One possibility for future research would be to question the economic
orientation of my approach. It might not be possible to quantify the harms
and benefits of campaign donations as I do in my model. If the harms of
political contributions are nonwelfarist in nature, tax revenue might prove
unable to compensate society for these harms. However, the fact that
contribution ceilings limit private donations without banning them suggests
that donations can be measured through utilitarian analysis. I find it hard to
imagine a justification for contribution ceilings that does not involve some
form of tradeoffs or cost-benefit analysis. If $2000 donations generate more
161. SeeLIoZ,supranote52,at6.
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benefit than harm, I suspect the harm generated by a $2001 donation could
easily be offset by monetary compensation. 162
Still, taxing campaign donations might communicate a negative social
message. We might worry that contribution taxes would express the idea
that politicians can be bought as long as one is willing to pay a sufficiently
high price. In this fashion, contribution taxes might increase the appearance
of corruption. Yet considering the corrupting potential of bundled
contributions and diverted funds, 163 I doubt that contribution taxes could
uniquely produce a message of this sort. Nevertheless, the appropriateness
of subjecting campaign finance regulation to economic analysis is certainly
open to debate.
164
It might also be worth investigating how contribution taxes would
affect the balance of power between political parties and related interest
groups. If contribution taxes enhance the political influence of the
superwealthy at the expense of the moderately wealthy, contribution taxes
could advantage liberal Democrats.1 65 However, to the extent contribution
ceilings would cause these donors to divert their funds, subjecting their
donations to taxes might instead benefit conservative Republicans. For
similar reasons, we might expect contribution taxes to benefit tax-averse
libertarians and other donors particularly likely to divert their funds in
response to the taxes. But if these donors face transaction costs high enough
to prevent them from diverting their funds, their greater aversion to
contribution taxes could decrease their relative influence. The effects of
contribution taxes on a group of donors will largely depend on how likely
the donors would be to divert their funds in response to contribution
ceilings.
Ultimately, without empirical studies, we can only speculate about the
overall effects of replacing contribution ceilings with contribution taxes.
Space constraints prevent me from discussing all of the assumptions that
went into my model, and lack of foresight limits my ability to anticipate
every objection that might be raised against contribution taxes.
Nevertheless, I believe my Note succeeds in making out an initial case for
such taxes.
In addition to theoretical arguments, future work will be needed to
determine the appropriate setting for design variables. I would favor forcing
donors to send their checks through the Federal Election Commission so
162. Furthermore, campaign donations are constitutionally protected speech that can only be
limited in the pursuit of a compelling state interest. See supra Section II.B. This fact strongly
suggests that large donations are not categorically bad in the sense that no amount of tax revenue
could compensate for their harms.
163. See, respectively, supra note 152 and Subsection I.B. 1.
164. For a general discussion of why certain values should not be subjected to economic
analysis, see Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987).
165. See supra notes 118-126 and accompanying text.
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that tax revenue might be deducted before any funds were made available to
candidates. 66 Alternately, some centralized bureaucracy might be
established to track donors' contributions if taxes are set at graduated rates.
But donations need not pass through the hands of regulators: Taxes could
be levied directly on either donors or candidates.
Other issues also remain for future consideration. First, a plan for
contribution taxes might specify the intended use for the tax revenue; many
may be attracted to contribution taxes as a mechanism for funding public
financing of campaigns. 67 Second, contribution taxes could also replace the
current ban on donations from corporate and union sources.168 Third, future
work might investigate the possibility of adjusting the tax rates based on
factors such as donor wealth. Finally, scholars should also discuss the
appropriate levels for a contribution tax schedule. 169 Empirical work will be
needed to determine how donors respond to various tax rate schedules.
Many other questions will also need to be answered if contribution
taxes are to become a plausible option for reform. Still, "[o]ver the past two
decades, the clear trend in regulation has been away from command-and-
control rules and toward incentive-based... systems."'170  Eventually,
campaign finance should catch up with these broader regulatory trends.
This Note hopes to begin the discussion of how to incorporate incentive-
based methods into campaign finance. Whether as contribution taxes or in
some other form, incentive-based regulations are the likely future of
campaign finance reform.
166. The FEC would probably need to be reformed for this method to be effective.
See generally BROOKS JACKSON, BROKEN PROMISE: WHY THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
FAILED (1990).
167. For an argument in favor of public financing, see Richard Briffault, Public Funding
and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563 (1999). For an argument against such
reform, see Bradley A. Smith, Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 591 (1999).
168. For a discussion of this ban, see Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the
Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 587 (1991); and Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion,
and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103 (2002).
169. Concerns about simplicity and administrative costs will probably necessitate that the tax
brackets be set according to a stepwise function, like those of the income tax, rather than as a
continuous function like the one I assume in my model. This constraint could weaken, but not
defeat, the case for contribution taxes.
170. Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Louge, The Cost of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174 (1998).
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